

The Department of State

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Progress Toward International Peace and Unity

*Address by Secretary Acheson*¹

Among the opportunities which this occasion offers me, none is more pleasant than to be able to express to Senator Wiley my gratitude for the kindness and help which I have received from him over many years.

When the Senator came on the Foreign Relations Committee in January 1945, I had just taken over the duties of Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. From then to the present time in varying capacities I have worked closely with the Committee and its members. Senator Wiley has moved from the junior member of the Committee to its ranking Republican member. He has carried with him always a nature in which kindness and helpfulness to others is fundamental and a code of values which has put the interests of his country before any partisan or personal advantage.

Such a man is, of course, a firm believer in a bipartisan—or, as Senator Vandenberg used to insist, nonpartisan—approach to foreign policy. He has been energetic in Washington and in extensive travels abroad to keep abreast of fast changing events. He constantly makes suggestions, examines closely the suggestions of others, and holds firmly to what he believes, after considering the case, to be the best and soundest course.

He knows also that things cannot always go according to our hopes. And so to him, as one of our novelists has said, "A trouble is a trouble and to be taken as such; he feels no obligation to snatch the knotted cord from the hand of God and deal out murderous blows." I salute him with affectionate esteem.

This occasion also affords me another valued opportunity to meet with you, as I have had the privilege of doing on a number of occasions over the past half a dozen years.

The other day, I looked back over some of the

subjects we have covered in these meetings, and it made an interesting short history of the broadening concerns and the developing programs of these postwar years.

Previous Meetings in Retrospect

In 1946 we talked about the control of atomic energy.

In 1947—a year in which we had the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and two fatefully unproductive meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow and in London—in that year, we discussed the implications of the expansionist and aggressive policies of the international Communist movement. We recognized that this was the fundamental problem we were up against and that it could not be talked out of existence. We recognized that what we faced was a long and hard task of building up strength among the free nations in place of the weakness that then existed. And when we talked about strength we had in mind not only a shield of military strength but people who had enough to eat and governments that had vitality and stability. The next year, as I recall, you had a holiday from these homilies.

In 1949² we discussed the problems presented by the Communist advance in China and the programs that were being developed that year for military aid to free nations.

And in 1950,³ on the occasion of my last appearance before you, we reviewed the principal lines of action which had by then been developed to safeguard our national security and well-being. The unfolding of this design had led to the ECA, the Point Four Program, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the various military-aid programs, and the Campaign of Truth, which is a necessary part of all we are doing to build a peaceful world.

¹ Made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Washington on Apr. 19 and released to the press on the same date.

² BULLETIN of May 8, 1949, p. 585.

³ *Ibid.*, May 1, 1950, p. 673.

Pattern of Events to Date

What I would like to do this afternoon is to bring this story up to date. I think it might be useful to look at some of the current developments in this continuing story—some of the items you are carrying on your front pages these days—to examine them, not as isolated phenomena, but as part of the whole pattern of events.

There is a temptation to look at the day-to-day events as a kind of verbal badminton game, in which some sort of poppycock goes back and forth across a net until someone scores a point. But the recent events I want to talk about are much more meaningful than moves in a propaganda game. They grow out of large policies and large purposes, both on our side and on the Communist side. And the stakes are still high: Whether there will be peace or war; whether our cherished values will survive.

Among other things, this spring has brought a whole series of Soviet moves which some people—mistakenly, I think—have grouped together and called a Soviet “peace offensive.”

I think a better name for these procedures might be the “golden apple” tactic. You may remember a story in Greek mythology, in which all the gods were invited to a wedding except one, and that was the Goddess of Discord. She was upset about this, and she threw a golden apple over the fence, hoping to cause a ruckus among the guests and break up the party.

Several apples have been tossed over the Iron Curtain this spring. Happily, they have not produced discord. The reason why this is so must be sought against the background of the great constructive purposes we and our allies have been carrying forward and the persistently destructive actions of the Communist movement.

We have arrived at a climactic moment in the development of the community of free nations. From the end of the war, we have been part of a vast constructive effort to create an organization of society in the world which would be stable, enduring, and strong.

In place of the shattered and fragmented world left in the wake of the Second World War, we and others who share the same aspirations have been trying to create conditions in the world in which our principles of the worth of the individual and the unity of society could survive and could flourish. These are not merely pleasant evangelistic ideas which we think it would be nice to propagate.

These efforts grow out of the urgent necessities we face in the world and out of the basic fiber of American life.

No free society can exist—neither our own, nor any other—if there are large areas of instability and weakness in the world. And so we have sought to help create a fabric of international society which would be made up of nations who may

represent great diversity in their traditions but who have in common a dedication to freedom, who are healthy both economically and politically and whose common strength is such that they need not live in fear.

Soviet Blocking of Constructive Efforts

What has been the role of the Soviet Union in this period? You who have reported the successive events of this story know only too well the long string of broken promises, the consistent blocking of our attempts to settle problems, the long record of noncooperation and hostility. The Soviet rulers have demonstrated that they seek to perpetuate chaos. Their fundamental aim has been to block the constructive efforts of the non-Communist states and to exploit weakness and discontent.

I think perhaps the most revealing indication of this intention was the Soviet rejection of the invitation to participate in the European Recovery Program.

Here, as late as 1947, was an offer by the United States to aid in the reconstruction, not only of Western Europe, but of all Europe. The Soviet refusal, and Soviet-compelled rejection by its Eastern European satellites, revealed more clearly than any other single gesture the direction of Soviet policy.

The Soviet answer was not only a flat “no” but a countertactic: The establishment of the Cominform for the express purposes of defeating the Marshall Plan; and the Molotov Plan, designed to bring the economies of Eastern Europe more firmly under Soviet control. When we sought to pull down barriers to trade and mutual assistance among all European nations, the Soviet answer was to raise still higher the barriers along the Elbe and the Danube.

But despite these obstructions, and despite even the Communist use of force, we have been making progress. This progress has not been even in all parts of the world, because the needs and possibilities have varied greatly from one area to another. But, taken together, the results have been encouraging enough to demonstrate that we are on the right track and must persevere.

In Europe, we have come to a very large and exciting conception, which is on the verge of being realized. This is unity in Western Europe within the framework of the Atlantic community.

Sketch of World Setting

I would like to talk about this at greater length in a moment. First, I would like to stretch the world setting in which this movement has been taking place.

In other parts of the world, our efforts have taken an almost infinite variety of forms but have been directed to the same purpose—to create a fab-

ric of international life in which there can be freedom from domination and opportunity to achieve individual and national fulfillment.

In some areas, this has meant primarily efforts to develop the underlying conditions of the life of the people, so that there could be an orderly development toward freedom and progress. In other areas, this has meant dealing with outright aggression by force of arms.

And over all this, there has been the creation and development of the United Nations, in which we have taken a leading part. We believed, and still believe, that a system founded on harmony of the great powers and the rule of law offers the best framework within which this diverse development could go forward.

Despite the fact that, at every step of the way, we have met nothing but obstructionism and hostility from the Soviet Union, we have been moving steadily, doggedly, and with a good measure of success, toward the fulfillment of our purposes.

The United Nations' success in halting and throwing back the aggression in Korea is a tremendous advance for collective security, which should not be obscured by the long and difficult negotiations to bring the fighting to an end.

Soviet obstruction has blocked great-power harmony but has not been able to stop the powerful advance of a collective-security system based upon the growing strength and unity of nations who believe in the Charter of the United Nations.

Despite Soviet efforts to obstruct, Japan is being restored to the community of nations. Without benefit of any assistance from the Soviet Union, many states have achieved their independence including Indonesia, the Philippines, Ceylon, Burma, Pakistan, and India. We and the nations associated in the Colombo Plan, again without benefit of any cooperation from the Soviet Union, are giving practical assistance to the peoples of South and Southeast Asia who are energetically striving to meet their own needs in their own way.

And that, indeed, is the touchstone of all our technical-cooperation programs and our policies throughout the Middle East and in all of Asia and Africa—what we seek to do is to help the people of these areas to fulfill their aspirations for self-government and individual freedom and material progress in a responsible way, in a peaceful and orderly way.

I think there is a growing understanding among the leaders of the people in these areas, despite the agonizing conflicts that arise as an inevitable part of this process of growth and development, that our purpose and our record is one of genuine help toward responsible and peaceful solutions. They have learned to be suspicious of the Communist Pied Piper who strides through this troubled area with a bag of tricky slogans and a pretty propaganda tune which leads only to the drowning of their hopes in a new imperialism.

Progress Toward World Unity

With this setting in mind, I come back to what has been happening in Europe. Here all that has been going on since 1945—the programs of relief, of economic recovery, of bold and courageous action to build stable governments free from foreign domination, and the growth toward vigorous military establishments capable of deterring attack—all these things have brought our friends in Europe to the threshold of the larger conception of the unity of all Western Europe.

European unity has been a goal for which men have striven for centuries, by diplomacy and by force. What is important about this effort we see before us now is that it will bring together, in free and voluntary association, in practical institutions growing out of the urgent necessities of the times, much of Western Europe.

There is a kind of unity, perhaps, east of the Iron Curtain—but it is the unity of the cemetery. This is an abomination against man's nature; it is contrary to history and it cannot endure.

What has been going on in Western Europe is a totally different thing. It will have strength because it meets human needs and desires. It has been a process of practical growth, moving haltingly at times, because it has sought to accommodate real conflicts by negotiation and peaceful persuasion.

The margin between success and failure in this operation has sometimes been a narrow one. The difficulties are deep and real. Our allies have been grappling with critical economic problems. They have wrestled with ancient rivalries and painful memories of recent conflicts.

Despite all this, they have come now within sight of the goal, and the thing that is at stake at this moment is whether they and we will be able to go forward to the realization of this conception. That is the issue.

Antagonistic Soviet Campaign

Soft music has been coming out of Moscow, about peaceful coexistence, about peaceful trade and German unity. This line to Western newsmen and others would be more persuasive if the Soviet propagandists were not at the same time, out of the other side of their mouths, engaged in one of the most vicious and savage episodes in their hate campaign against the West.

The Communists have trumped up a monstrous charge that the U.N. Command has used germ warfare in Korea. This charge has been denied categorically and repeatedly by the U.N. Command in the field and by the Government of the United States in Washington. I deny it again here.

Not only this; but General Ridgway has offered to the International Red Cross every facility to investigate this charge behind our own lines. Although the Red Cross asked for similar facili-

ties from the Communists, they received instead only defamation and abuse. Again, when the World Health Organization offered to help combat any epidemics which might exist, they were ignored.

American newspaper enterprise has exposed the falsity of the alleged "proofs" of these charges advanced by the Communists, and the Voice of America and our other information media have been combating this hate campaign energetically with the facts of the situation.

The Soviet so-called "peace campaign" might be more persuasive, too, if our memories were so short that we forgot the Stockholm "peace appeal" of 1950—a peace appeal which was immediately followed by the Communist attack on Korea.

Peaceful trade has been another subject of the current campaign. Ostensibly called to examine world trade policies, a recent Moscow economic conference was used to unfold grandiose proposals for expanded trade.

The offers made by the President of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce linked machinery and herring, ships and lemons, ball bearings and textiles—a cunning mixture of consumer goods with items of strategic importance. By appearing to offer new markets, the Soviets seek to sow dissension and to secure strategic materials to build their war-making potential. The facts are, of course, that the consumer goods are available to them at any time they choose to purchase them and through normal channels.

Other pertinent facts, not advertised in Moscow, reveal current Soviet steps to halt trade between East Germany and Greece and the well-known, long-standing Soviet effort to starve Yugoslavia into submission by halting trade between that country and its neighbors.

The security controls, which we and other free governments have imposed over trade with the Soviet bloc, will continue to be necessary as long as the broad course of Soviet policy is directed toward the maintenance of a huge military machine.

In this connection, it is pertinent for us to note that the United States will increase immeasurably the attractiveness of this type of Soviet propaganda if we permit restrictionism here to shut out foreign goods. These restrictive practices will, of course, increase rather than lighten the burden on the American taxpayer.

Discussions on Germany Delay Action

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has sent two notes to the British, the French, and ourselves concerning Germany.

In its first note, on March 10,⁴ the Soviet Government urged that the four occupying powers should discuss the German peace treaty. The

⁴ *Ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1952, p. 531.

treaty they had in mind would permit the creation of a German national army and prohibit Germany from associating in western European defense. The treaty they propose would also freeze the frontiers along the provisional lines discussed at Potsdam.

The three Governments replied to this note on March 25,⁵ after consultation with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. This reply pointed out that a peace treaty could only be discussed with an all-German Government and that the existence of an all-German Government depended on the holding of free elections in the whole of Germany. They called attention to the fact that at Potsdam it was decided that frontiers should be fixed in the peace treaty.

The three Governments, again on the basis of consultation with the Federal Republic, also made it clear that they were engaged in a great forward step toward building up the unity of Western Europe through a common defense policy and that they intended to continue to follow that policy.

In its second note, the Soviet Union repeated the negative positions it had previously taken and made no affirmative proposals regarding German unity or free elections. Instead, it continued to emphasize proposals of what ought to go into a German peace treaty, disregarding the necessity of having an all-German Government in order to have a peace treaty.

When it came to the question of free elections, the only proposal from the Soviet Union was that there be more discussion.

We and our allies have had considerable experience with the Soviet Union in discussing things, when there is no agreement on principles. We have found that discussion, under these circumstances, is a delaying action and a frustrating experience.

We cannot forget that these matters have been discussed repeatedly at great length with the Soviet Union. This was done in 1947 at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow and again in London; in 1949, for weeks at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris; and again for months at the Palais Rose in 1951.

The main things that emerged from the Soviet discussion of elections and the creation of a government which would have jurisdiction over the whole of Germany are these:

First, the Soviet Union never has been willing to relax in any respect whatever its control over Eastern Germany. The Soviet Union would never even discuss Soviet ownership over a vast amount of East German industry.

Second, the Soviet Government was bending every effort to infiltrate into Western Germany.

And third, they insisted that every major exercise of power by an all-German Government should be subject to a Soviet veto.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 530.

These attitudes have never changed.

An analysis of the first Soviet communication shows plainly that the Soviet Government is making no commitment of any sort as to what kind of elections they are prepared to permit. There is no reason to believe that they wish to have a Germany any less under their control, and they do not make their position on this point any clearer.

Also, the Soviet Government continues to insist that a German Government shall be precluded at all times from associating itself with the great project of the unification of Western Europe.

The Soviet Union would like the Germans to think that there is a contradiction between unification of Western Europe and unification of Germany. There is not. Germany can be united and free as a full member of the free community of Europe. But a united Germany cut off from defense with and by the West could not be a free Germany. The German people have only to look across the curtain at their brothers in East Germany to see what the Soviet Union means by freedom.

We and our allies and the German people cannot forget the 7 years of fruitless negotiations with the Soviet Union to try to reach agreement on an honest basis for German Union. We cannot forget the Soviet walk-out from the Allied Control Council in Berlin, or the ruthless Soviet attempt to starve out the two million people of Berlin, or the Soviet termination of the quadripartite administration of the city of Berlin.

Across the border from Germany are the Austrians who were promised their independence in 1943. After 258 meetings between our deputies and the Soviet deputy, we and the Austrian people are still waiting for the Soviet Union to fulfill this promise.

The Western Powers and the West Germans have made many proposals for free elections in Germany. The latest effort is being made through the United Nations, which set up a commission to investigate the possibilities of free elections throughout Germany. That commission was granted free access to all Western Germany, but it still waits in vain for permission to enter Eastern Germany.

In the light of all this we are entitled to ask for some tangible evidence that there has been a shift in the Soviet position.

Our keen awareness of the past will not prevent us from giving serious attention to these or any other Soviet proposals. Together with the British, the French, and the Germans, we are studying the latest Soviet note. Of course, I cannot attempt here to forecast the course of these considerations.

We are willing and eager to resolve any or all major frictions in the world by peaceful negotiation, when and if there appears to be any honest and reasonable basis for negotiations. We have

given an earnest of this in our proposals for disarmament.

But we and our allies have made it clear that we cannot take a step backwards; we cannot jeopardize the emergence in Europe of the new era of cooperation which is replacing the rivalry and distrust of the past. And so we continue to give our full support to plans designed to secure the participation of Germany in a purely defensive European Community. For here is the true path of peace.

Open Door Policy Toward Discussion

If any believe that the Western attitudes lack in initiative and are purely responses to Soviet stimulus, they must find here the refutation. Here they must see proof that we have been moving in the right direction. Here they must see on the Soviet side responses to the initiatives of the free nations in building soundly and strongly.

As we survey the world around us, we still must take cognizance of the basic facts in the present situation. We are still confronted with massive armed forces, backed by a huge military budget and powerful reserves. The military resources of the satellite nations are still being mobilized. The peoples of these countries are being kept in increasing isolation from the outside world and in calculated ignorance of the truth. The Communist international movement is still fostering insurrection and subversion wherever it can. And venomous hate continues to pour out of the vast Soviet propaganda machine.

There is only one way to hasten the day when we may hope for peaceful actions, not words, from the Soviet rules—and that is to push resolutely forward on our present course.

I repeat with undiminished belief what I said to you in 1947: This may be a long campaign. It will take nerve and steadfastness. We must be firm, and we must never close the door to agreement or discussion.

Above all, we must hold fast to our faith in freedom which shall some day prevail in all the world.

Correction

In the BULLETIN of March 31, 1952, page 508, Carroll Binder was incorrectly identified as the U.S. representative in the Subcommittee on Freedom of Information. Mr. Binder serves on the Subcommittee as a private individual, not as a representative of this Government. The Subcommittee is a body of experts appointed by the U.N. Economic and Social Council.

In the same issue, page 515, second column, line 19 should read, "On March 21 the representatives of Chile, the. . ."

Our Far Eastern Policy

by John M. Allison

*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

I have found in some 20 years of activity in the field of foreign affairs that many of us are apt to forget or not to realize the implications of the fact that foreign affairs are *foreign affairs*. As Harold Nicolson, brilliant British commentator on diplomacy and allied matters, has said, we must realize that foreign affairs concern "not our own national interests only, but also the interests of other countries." We cannot expect a foreign policy to be developed and to be put into action in the same manner as, for example, a national budget, an education bill, or a bill to build a levee along the Mississippi. These matters of domestic policy can be prepared by a responsible Cabinet member or can originate directly in the Congress, can then be passed by the Congress and carried out by whatever is the appropriate agency. However, in dealing with foreign affairs we often ignore the fact that other countries with interests and prejudices as strong as our own must be consulted and brought into agreement if any policy is to be effective.

This is particularly true in the Far East where we have had recent examples of the fact that a policy which has much to commend it from a domestic American point of view finds opposition in other countries when we attempt to implement it. The Congress, in providing legislation for the establishment of a mutual-security program, very properly considered that U.S. funds should not be made available to countries which were not generally in sympathy with the broad aims of the United States and the United Nations, and in the Mutual Security Act set forth certain conditions which had to be met by countries who wished to obtain military, economic, or technical assistance from the United States. Under the provisions of

this Act, it has been considered necessary to request countries seeking aid to sign agreements in which they undertake to observe certain conditions set forth in the Mutual Security Act. In Asia we have found that particularly the younger nations, which have just recently achieved their independence, have been reluctant to sign such agreements as they interpreted any such action as indicating they were taking definite sides in the cold war, which at present seems to divide the world. These new countries, all of them non-Communist if not anti-Communist, had hoped to be able to follow a neutral course just as our own United States tried to do in the early years of its independence. It has been necessary for those of us who are interested in giving aid and assistance to these countries, when they desire it, for the purpose of achieving stability and security to persuade them that they are not violating their own best interests in agreeing to the conditions set down in the Mutual Security Act. In most cases this has been possible but in a few there is still hesitation. I believe that when these countries fully understand the motives behind the U.S. action they will agree that our course is proper, but, in the meantime, we do encounter these difficulties.

The Present Situation in the Far East

Before we can usefully consider what our policy in any part of the world should be, we must spend time considering what the present situation is in the area with which we are dealing. What is the situation in the Far East today? Certainly the basic fact which we must always keep in mind is that today the nations of the Far East are united in at least one thing, if nothing else, and that is their desire for national freedom and independence. We still hear criticism of Western imperialism and colonialism, and there are many who would have the United States take a strong stand

¹Excerpts from an address made at the fourteenth annual Public Affairs Conference, Principia College of Liberal Arts, Elsah, Ill., on Apr. 17 and released to the press on the same date.

against its European allies in order to remove such vestiges of colonialism as still remain. But before we agree wholeheartedly with this stand it may be helpful to think for a moment of what has happened in the Far East in the few years since the end of World War II. Seven nations with a population of over 600 million have attained independence. These nations were formerly members of the colonial systems of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Japan, and the United States. This is by no means a negligible achievement. Much remains to be done but in our impatience let us not forget that much has already been done.

It is important to realize that these new countries often lack a sufficient number of trained leaders, that they have achieved independence at the end of a long and destructive war which has disrupted their economies and their social systems. It would be unrealistic to expect that in the short period of 7 years which has elapsed since the end of the war in the Pacific that there would arise strong and stable countries who could expect to carry on their activities in the same manner and with the same degree of success as the older countries of the Western world with their long experience of independent activity. We might perhaps look back at our own history and study the confusion which existed in the United States during the first 7 or 8 years after the conclusion of the war of independence and while we were still operating under the Articles of Confederation. When we see the difficulties that we had in developing unity of action and a strong central government in a country where a great majority of the people were from the same stock and with the same traditions, we cannot be impatient with the efforts made by these new countries of Asia with their great varieties of races, cultures, and languages often under one national leadership. There are mutual suspicions among these new countries just as there were mutual suspicions and distrust among the 13 colonies which made up the new American Nation. We must also remember in thinking of the attitudes of these new countries toward the United States that they look upon us as one of the Western Powers and bracket us with the European powers, that their experience with the West in the past has not always been happy, and that there is a residue of suspicion left which will take many years and much understanding to overcome.

In addition to these new states such as Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines, we see in Asia today another great nation emerging from 6 years of occupation as a defeated country and about to resume its place in the family of nations. The peace treaty with Japan will go into effect next week and this nation of almost 85 million vigorous, intelligent, and industrially trained people will once again be a factor to be reckoned with whenever we think of Asia.

Aftermath of War and Japan's Future

Let us consider briefly some of the effects of the war on Japan which have a bearing on the future of that country. Before the war, Korea and Formosa together supplied Japan almost 2 million metric tons of rice annually so that the Japanese empire was almost self-sufficient in food. Today, Japan must depend upon foreign sources to meet the approximate 20 percent deficit in its own food supplies. Japan's former sources of raw materials in Manchuria and North China are now behind the Iron Curtain so that it must seek elsewhere those raw materials which are essential to its industrial life. Its own factories have had to be put back into operation; its financial system reorganized; its merchant fleet which contributed so much before the war to the prosperity of Japan has had to be rehabilitated almost in its entirety. But even more perhaps than these material factors which for some time to come will condition Japan's future, there must be considered the effect of the war upon the people. The shock of defeat, the readjustments necessary as the result of the removal of many of Japan's former political and industrial leaders from their normal activities have created problems which cannot be ignored. As I have just mentioned, for a period of more than 6 years the Japanese people have lived under alien military occupation. While there can be no question but that this occupation was a most enlightened one, nevertheless it was an occupation, and in the final analysis the Japanese people have not been responsible for their own destiny. Up until recently when occupation controls were relaxed in anticipation of the treaty's coming into effect, there was a natural and inevitable reluctance on the part of the Japanese leaders to take the initiative in solving the many political, social, and economic post-war problems when the final responsibility rested elsewhere. This was one of the most pressing reasons why the U.S. Government made every possible effort to bring about an early peace treaty and the early end of the occupation. We saw the necessity of letting the Japanese leaders stand on their own feet and begin to run their own country.

In addition to the economic, political, and social changes brought about as the result of the war, anyone who realistically considers the future of Japan must take into account the strategic situation in which Japan finds itself and the relationship of the present power situation in Asia to the future of Japan. It would be pleasant to ignore the question of power relationships and to consider only what would be wise and desirable from the moral, political, and economic viewpoints. Unfortunately, we cannot ignore the problem created by a change in the balance of power in the Far East any more than elsewhere in the world. An astute scholar has recently said that statesmen who profess not to believe in the "balance of power" are like scientists who do not believe in the law of gravity. So if we are to consider the future of

Japan and our policy toward it as it emerges from a disastrous war and 6 years of occupation, we must consider the effect of the present power situation in Asia. This is particularly acute because of the completely unarmed position in which Japan finds itself off the coast of Asia where Communist aggression has been most active. In fact, there is reason to believe that the outbreak of this Communist aggression was at least partially due to the unarmed condition of Japan and the belief of the aggressors that domination of the Korean peninsula would make more easy the ultimate domination of Japan with its great industrial base and industrially trained population. In developing policy toward Japan, these facts cannot be ignored nor are they being ignored by the leaders of Japan.

Asian Resistance to Aggression

In looking at the rest of Asia, we are often discouraged by the evidences we see of disaster, continued fighting in Korea, continued stalling and befogging of issues by the Communist negotiators at the truce talks, the enslavement of 400 million Chinese by a ruthless, Soviet-dominated Communist Government, continued pressure by Communist forces on the young states of Indochina, and Communist-directed banditry in Malaya. All of these and more are certainly enough to discourage anyone, but a year ago the situation was even worse. One of my colleagues in the Department of State was fond of saying that the situation in the Far East at that time reminded him of the opening sentence of Swiss Family Robinson. You will recall that it goes something like this: "For six days the storm raged with unabated fury and on the seventh grew much worse." At that time the U.N. Forces had almost been thrown out of Korea. The Japanese people were becoming more and more restive under military occupation which, due to Soviet intransigence, there seemed no prospect of bringing to a close. The Philippines were almost bankrupt; Huk bandits were terrorizing the countryside. There were indications of an early attack by Communist China on either Formosa or Indochina or both. There was not even the beginning of any sort of collective-security system in the whole Pacific area.

Anyone who claims that the situation today leaves no cause for worry would be deliberately ignoring reality, but nevertheless, compared with a year ago, I believe we can point to real progress. Let us consider for a moment the situation today in Korea. Some short-sighted persons have called our action in Korea "useless" and there is considerable understandable impatience at the long drawn-out struggle going on in that peninsula. But before we make up our minds that the sacrifices made in Korea by many brave men have been useless, let us consider what they have accomplished. We must remember that it was not

the Republic of Korea, it was not the United States, nor was it the United Nations which started the fighting; but it was the Republic of Korea, the United States, and the United Nations which stood up to aggression and beat it back. Today the aggressors have been thrown back beyond the point from which they started. The Communists have utterly failed in achieving their objectives in Korea. They have lost well over a million trained soldiers and enormous quantities of matériel. North Korea has been devastated and for years to come will be an economic liability with nothing to compensate for this destruction. One of the most important results of the Communist aggression in Korea has been the action of the United Nations. For the first time in modern history, an international organization has shown that not only can it be effective in times of peace but that it can and will resist aggression. The League of Nations was never able to accomplish this. A real forward step has been made in development of a world organization determined that aggression shall not prosper.

As I said a few moments ago, a year ago it looked as if the Chinese Communist forces might soon attack Formosa or Indochina. There is no doubt that the action taken by the United Nations in Korea had a real deterrent effect on the plans of the Communist aggressors so that those areas have had an additional year in which to continue building up their economic, political, and military strength. The threat, of course, has not disappeared. There are said to be some 200,000 Chinese Communist troops massed on the Indochinese border. The Chinese Communist press and radio continue to cry for the conquest of Formosa. The free world cannot afford to relax but it can have confidence, born of experience in Korea, that the nations of the free world will continue to resist aggression.

The Philippines over the past year have made remarkable progress. The Communist-led Huks have been reduced to small scattered bands still able to commit acts of terrorism but now unable to mount the large-scale attacks of the past on provincial towns. The Government's deficit dropped to less than one million pesos from 154 million pesos the year before. Production of export crops has boomed. But even more important, in my opinion, has been the effect on the people of the Philippines of the elections of last November, which, due to the courageous leadership of Philippine President Quirino and his Secretary of Defense Magsaysay, were the most honest and free of any ever held in that land. The result of the election was a great step forward in the establishment of democratic processes in the Far East and was so recognized by President Quirino even though his own party suffered defeat.

Fighting continues in Indochina and we hear much about it, but we do not pay enough attention to the progress which has been made in other areas

in the three Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Due in part to American aid, there has been a gradual increase in economic recovery. Exports of rubber and rice, while still far below the prewar level, were the highest last year they have been since V-J Day. There has been real progress in building up the national army of Vietnam, which has been mainly equipped through American aid. Approximately 1,000 new Vietnamese officers were graduated from training schools last year plus significant numbers of technicians and noncommissioned officers. The progress these three Indochinese States have made along the road to independence was most vividly illustrated by their participation in the Japanese Peace Conference on a basis of equality with all the other participants, and their signature of the treaty as independent nations. The new nations of Indonesia and Burma have been completing the organization of their own institutions in such a way as to carry out their new responsibilities. Constant progress is being made and both of these countries have shown a determination to develop institutions and to suppress communism. They are jealous of their independence and wish to preserve it in their own way, and they are sometimes reluctant to accept assistance as, rightly or wrongly, they fear that such assistance might compromise in some manner their newly won independence or prevent them from maintaining their position of neutrality in what they tend to view as a power struggle now dividing the world.

An Area Security System Developed

In looking at the present situation in the Far East, we see that whereas a year ago there was not even an embryonic security system embracing the whole area, today we have a series of mutual security and defense pacts soon to be brought into effect with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand which, as the President has said, are "initial steps" in the development of an over-all security system for the Pacific area. These pacts have two purposes. The peoples of Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines have been much closer to Japanese aggression than we have been and there was a natural reluctance in those countries to think in terms of a peace treaty with Japan that would not make impossible by its own terms the resurgence of Japan's aggression and the possibility of Japanese rearmament. The United States, on the other hand, believed that the only kind of a treaty which would have any hope of lasting was one which was not punitive, which was based on trust and a spirit of reconciliation, and that it was not possible to seek certainty about Japan's future actions by imposing restrictions in a treaty which would deny freedom to Japan. While such restrictions might initially give an illusion of certainty, it was the belief of the United States that such an illusion would be quickly shat-

tered. The Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines were able to give their people the assurances they needed about their future security as a result of the conclusion of these mutual security and defense pacts, and they were then able to join with the United States in offering to Japan a treaty of reconciliation and trust. But these mutual defense and security treaties do not look only, or even primarily, to the past. They are the basis for hope in the future and set forth in the language of our Monroe Doctrine our sense of common destiny with these peoples of the Pacific. As John Foster Dulles stated in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning these treaties:²

It is highly appropriate that not only our friends, but our potential enemies, should learn that our concern with Europe, evidenced by the North Atlantic Treaty, and our concern with Japan, in no sense imply any lack of concern for our Pacific allies of World War II or lack of desire to preserve and deepen our solidarity with them for security. The security treaties with these three countries are a logical part of the effort not merely to liquidate the old war, but to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific as against the hazard of new war.

Having looked for a time at what the present situation is in the Far East, let us consider what is the U.S. policy for the area as a whole and toward specific parts. In some measure the description of the present situation has given a clue to various aspects of our policy. It is of course true that our policy toward the Far East, as is our policy toward other areas of the world, is designed to strengthen the fabric of peace generally and specifically the security of our own country. But such broad general statements are not of great utility in considering what we should do. In thinking of our Far Eastern policy, I often go back to a book published 30 years ago, "Americans in Eastern Asia," by Tyler Dennett, and as I read the concluding paragraph of that work I believe it gives, if properly interpreted in today's terms, a brief and forthright description of what American policy has been and is with respect to the Far East. This is that statement:

In conclusion, we repeat that the tap-root of American policy in Asia is most-favored-nation treatment. An attitude of self-righteousness is neither becoming nor justified. American policy is not philanthropic; it is not, in its motive and history, benevolent; but it is beneficent, for the United States is so situated that American interests in Asia are best promoted by the growth of strong, prosperous and enlightened Asiatic states. Indeed it is difficult for an American to believe that the repression or weakening of any part of Asia is a benefit to any power. The United States is committed to its policy by geographical, economic and political facts, and in the same measure is also bound to a policy of cooperation with all powers which sincerely profess a similar purpose.

Obviously, if the taproot of American policy is most-favored-nation treatment with its implication of equality of treatment and opportunity, we cannot look with equanimity at the Iron Curtain

² BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 190.

which is being erected to keep the 400 million Chinese on the mainland of Asia from contact and peaceful cooperation with the rest of Asia and with the rest of the world. If it is in American interest to promote the growth of "strong, prosperous, and enlightened Asiatic states," America must continue a policy of assistance and encouragement to the newly independent states of Asia, and we must be willing to cooperate, as we are doing through the United Nations and through our mutual security and defense treaties with other powers which sincerely profess a similar purpose.

Japanese Treaty of Equality Breaks Precedent

We have made clear through our initiative in bringing about a peace treaty with Japan our policy toward that nation. We have insisted that this treaty should be a liberal one—one which would contain promise for the future and not the seeds of future wars. We negotiated this treaty with Japan on a basis of equality—there was mutual give and take. When the Japanese delegation came to San Francisco to sign the treaty they were not kept in confinement away from the other delegations as had been the fate of the German plenipotentiaries at Versailles after World War I. The Japanese were received in the same manner as all the others. This treaty broke new ground in international relations. Sir Zarfrullah Khan, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Pakistan, said of the treaty:

It opens to Japan the door passing through which it may take up among its fellow sovereign nations a position of dignity, honor and equality It is evidence of a new departure in the relations of the East and the West as they have subsisted during the last few centuries.

But American policy goes further than just advocating that Japan be given a good start and a position of equality among the nations as the peace treaty goes into effect. We realize that Japan must be given security in which to make use of her newly won freedom. It is in this field of security that Japan's problems will, in many respects, be most difficult. For the time being Japan's defense from external aggression will be dependent upon the maintenance in Japan of American forces in accordance with the security pact signed by Japan and the United States on September 8, 1951.³ At some point Japan must decide in what manner she wishes to contribute to her own self-defense. That is a problem which has both political and economic aspects.

There is a genuine concern on the part of many Japanese as to the means by which they can discharge their responsibility for their own defense while avoiding the creation of a military machine such as that which formerly took over and ran Japan. There is also the question in Japan as to how the great costs of a modern defense establish-

ment can be financed without so weakening the economic fabric of the country that it would be a ready prey to that very Communist infiltration which it is designed to combat. These are real problems. As President Truman has pointed out, a beginning has been made in the development in the Pacific area of security on a collective basis which will enable each nation to have security without developing itself those forces which can be an offensive threat. The Japanese Government has elected to take part, and it cannot be too often emphasized that this choice of Japan's was a free choice. As early as February 1951 when Mr. Dulles was in Japan he discussed this general topic with the Japanese and he said publicly that if Japan wished it could share collective protection against direct aggression. He went on to say:

That, however, is not a choice which the United States is going to impose upon Japan. It is an invitation. The United States is not interested in slavish conduct. . . . We are concerned only with the brave and the free. The choice must be Japan's own choice.

This decision of the Japanese Government to enter into a security pact with the United States was undoubtedly a difficult one. However, just as the United States has shown trust in the Japanese people and Government by advocating and signing a treaty of reconciliation without arduous post-treaty controls, so must the Japanese people trust the U.S. Government and people that they will so implement this security treaty that it will contribute to the true long-term good of both countries and the peace of the whole Pacific area. The United States will not falter in its determination to insure the security of Japan.

U.S. Aims in Korea

In Korea our aim is as it always has been—the achievement of an independent, united, and free Korea. In cooperation with our friends in the United Nations we are committed to repel the aggression from North Korea and to restore peace and security in the area. We have repelled the aggression—the aggressors have been thrown back beyond the point from which they started. Our military leaders are now engaged in armistice talks which we devoutly hope will soon bring an end to the fighting. If we succeed in getting an armistice we shall then proceed to the political stage where we will discuss how to bring about the independent, united, and free Korea which is our objective. If the armistice talks fail, we will be confronted with a most serious situation. It would not be profitable to speculate at this time as to what we should do in that unhappy event. We shall continue to do our part to make the talks a success—if they fail it will be because the Communists do not want them to succeed.

But let me utter a word of caution. Should an armistice be obtained it would not mean our

³ For text of the pact, see *ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1951, p. 464.

troubles are over. There are the political talks which I have mentioned. There are other problems in the Far East which can still plague us. I have spoken of the continuing threat to Indochina and Formosa. The United States and the other nations of the free world cannot relax—I am afraid we must learn to live for some time to come with crisis. We shall need all the resolution, firmness, and patience we can summon if the tremendous sacrifices we have already made are not to be in vain.

Conflicts of Opinion Regarding China

What shall we do about China? This is a question about which there are many conflicts of opinion, and which evokes much passion. But some things are clear and agreed. Communist China is an aggressor, declared so by the United Nations—the people of mainland China are suffering under purge after purge in which thousands are killed and more imprisoned. Foreign businessmen and missionaries are not allowed to carry on their normal activities, even those whose countries have recognized the Communist regime. At the same time, Communist Chinese at the Soviet-sponsored economic conference in Moscow make high-sounding offers of trade deals with the West. There are in Red China, American and British businessmen through whom it would be normal for these trade offers to be made. But no, these men are in jail, or being threatened with prison or worse if they don't agree to Communist demands. Under such circumstances why should we take seriously the Communist offer of friendly trade with the West? Americans have a traditional friendship for the people of China. Today, however, it is only possible to show that friendship through the Chinese Government on Formosa. Much has been said about the faults of that Government. I do not intend to enter that controversy. I intend to look to the future—not the past—we must work with what we have, not what we might like to have.

It seems to me abundantly clear that the United States is committed by the terms of President Truman's statement of June 27, 1950,⁴ to prevent Formosa from falling into Communist hands. That this continues to be our policy is evidenced by the fact that the Administration has asked the Congress to include in the Mutual Security Act provision for funds for economic and military support for Formosa which will help the Government and people there to increase their ability to defend themselves. In the opinion of the U.S. Government the National Government still represents China. This opinion is shared by the majority of the members of the United Nations. There have been 96 votes on this question in more

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 3, 1950, p. 5.

than 45 international organizations and the National Government continues to occupy the Chinese seat in all of them. It is our policy that this shall continue to be the case. The Chinese Government and people on Formosa are making a real effort to create conditions there which will show the world that they are deserving of its support. We shall continue helping them in this task.

U.S. Goal—Toward a True Freedom

In the rest of Asia we are helping the countries of Southeast Asia—Indonesia, Indochina, Burma, the Philippines, and Thailand—with military or economic assistance programs or both. We are giving considerable help to the Associated States of Indochina and to France to enable them to continue their struggle against the Communist-led rebels of the Vietminh. We shall continue to give such aid. In their association with France the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have been granted constantly increasing attributes of independence. We all know what would happen if the Communists should triumph. There would be loud shouting about having thrown the foreigner out and restoring independence to a colonial people. But where is the true independence of North Korea, Communist China, Outer Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, or those States which were among the first to fall behind the Iron Curtain—Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia? I think we are doing the right thing in helping our friends in Indochina toward a true freedom, not an illusory one.

The United States need not be hesitant in actively working to advance the ideal of freedom which was the foundation of our own revolution. As recently pointed out by an astute British writer, Barbara Ward, in the *New York Times*, Thomas Jefferson once prophesied that this ideal would be capable of permanent extension—"to some parts sooner, to others later but finally to all." Let us not fear to live up to our tradition.

Communiqués Regarding Korea To the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2564, March 21; S/2565, March 24; S/2566, March 25; S/2568, March 26; S/2569, March 27; S/2570, March 28; S/2572, March 31; S/2573, April 2; S/2586, April 2; S/2587, April 3; S/2588, April 7; S/2589, April 7; S/2591, April 8.

Ratification of Japanese Peace Treaty And Pacific Security Treaties

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House April 15]

As President of the United States, it gives me great satisfaction to sign, and thus ratify, on this day the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the Security Treaty with Australia and New Zealand, the Security Treaty with Japan, and the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of the Philippines. The signing of these documents completes another in the series of steps being taken by free nations to bring peace and security to the Pacific.

When the United States and at least two more of the countries mentioned in article 23 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan have deposited their ratifications, the historic ceremonies of restoring Japan to a position of independence, honor, and equality in the world community which began at San Francisco last September will have been brought to a conclusion.¹ The related security and mutual defense treaties will become effective when their ratifications are either deposited or exchanged in accordance with their respective terms.

In signing these documents, I know that I express the essential unity and will of the American people for the earliest possible achievement of lasting peace and freedom with security. The Treaty of Peace with Japan and the related security and mutual defense treaties, when they go into effect, will bring that goal nearer to realization.

¹ Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan provides that the treaty shall come into force when Japan, the United States, and any five of the following countries have deposited their instruments of ratification with the U.S. Government: Australia, Canada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom.

Up to today ratifications have been deposited by the following countries named in article 23: Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Thus, in order to bring the treaty into force it will be necessary for the United States and two other countries named in article 23 to deposit their instruments of ratification.

Subject to the expected prior deposit of at least two additional instruments of ratification, the United States plans to deposit its own instrument of ratification on Apr. 28, 1952. These three additional deposits will bring the Treaty of Peace with Japan into effect on that date for those countries which have deposited their ratifications by that time.

This advance announcement of the planned effective date of the Treaty of Peace is being made in order to permit an orderly completion of the transition of Japan from the present occupation status to that of full sovereignty. In addition, it will enable those nations which are reestablishing relations with the Japanese Government to change from their present accreditation to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to that of normal peacetime relations with the Japanese Government.

The related security and mutual defense treaties will become effective when their ratifications are either deposited or exchanged in accordance with their respective specific terms.

Point Four Agreements Concluded With Iran

[Released to the press April 15]

The Department of State announced on April 15 that project agreements for technical cooperation in the fields of agriculture, public health, and education have been concluded with the Government of Iran. The project agreements were signed on April 1, 1952, in Tehran by William E. Warne, U.S. Director of Technical Cooperation, for the United States, and Khalil K. Taleghani, Minister of Agriculture, Mohammad Ali Maleki, Minister of Health, and Mahmoud Hessabi, Minister of Education, representing Iran.

The three project agreements, calling for an expenditure of approximately \$11,000,000 by the United States, describe the detailed operations of the expanded Point Four Program provided for in the exchange of notes at Tehran on January 19, 1952. At that time the United States agreed to contribute up to \$23,450,000 for the 1952 fiscal year toward the program of technical cooperation.¹

The agricultural program includes such projects as the development of an agricultural extension service, improved livestock practices, irrigation development, soil and water conservation, and plant development.

The public-health program provides for the establishment of sanitary engineering, nursing, and public-health education divisions in the Ministry of Health to combat communicable diseases, improve sanitary conditions, and provide maternal and child-health care, and other services necessary for the development of a rural public-health service.

The objectives of the education program are to provide for improved rural facilities by establishing demonstration schools, better training for a greater number of rural teachers, and the extending of the program to remote areas.

As an emergency measure to meet the local currency costs of the Point Four Program, which the Iranian Government is unable to pay at the present time, agreements have also been entered into which will make rials available for the technical-cooperation projects in the amount of \$6,000,000.

The first of these is the student emergency assistance program to provide dollars in the United States for subsistence and tuition of stranded Iranians whose sources of funds have been cut off by the Iranian Government currency restrictions.² Under this program, rials must be deposited by the students' sponsors in Iran before the students may receive dollars in the United States. The rials go into a special account to be used by the Point Four director in Iran to meet local currency requirements. The United States has agreed to use up to \$1,000,000 in this program.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1952, p. 217.

² *Ibid.*, Apr. 28, 1952, p. 659.

The other is a program whereby the United States will supply approximately 34,000 metric tons of sugar valued at \$5,000,000. The agreement to cover the terms of the sugar purchase was concluded on March 31, 1952, in Tehran.

Under the terms of the consumer goods (sugar) agreement the Government of Iran will sell the sugar through regular commercial channels and will deposit the equivalent of the \$5,000,000 in rials in a special account for the Point Four director to use in meeting local expenses of the program.

The sugar will be shipped to Persian Gulf ports of Iran in three separate shipments in May, June, and July.

Emergency Assistance For Iranian Students

[Released to the press April 7]

A program to provide emergency assistance for approximately 1,000 Iranian students stranded in the United States by reason of their sources of funds having been cut off by the new currency restrictions adopted by the Government of Iran because of the shortage of dollars, was announced by the Department of State on April 7.

The purpose of the emergency program is to provide dollars in the United States only for maintenance and tuition in amounts equivalent to Iranian currency made available by the students' sponsors or parents in Iran. The rials (Iranian currency) deposited by the sponsors will go into a special account to be used by the Point Four director in Iran to meet local currency requirements of the technical-cooperation and economic-development program.

The Near East Foundation, 54 East 64th Street, New York City, will administer this Iranian Student Emergency Assistance Program under an agreement with the Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State.

The Point Four Program in Iran is one of rural development—improvement in agriculture, health, and education at the village level. There is an inadequate number of Iranian specialists in most fields and much of the success of the Point Four Program will depend on increasing the number of urgently needed technicians.

The emergency student assistance program covers Iranians enrolled as regular or special students in recognized colleges and universities and also visiting professors and research workers attached to educational and scientific institutions. The majority of the Iranian students in the United States is studying technical subjects such as agriculture, engineering, and medicine.

The emergency program is to cover students' living costs and other necessary expenses through

the end of the 1951-52 academic year, or through August 21, 1952. The amount a student can receive for living expenses is determined by the university and in no case may exceed \$160 a month.

The Iranian students are attending more than 200 different schools but more than half of them are enrolled in New York University, Columbia University, Syracuse University, University of California, (at Berkeley and at Los Angeles), University of Southern California, Los Angeles City College, Indiana University, University of Nebraska, Utah State Agricultural College, and the University of Maryland.

Recent Publications

[Released by the Department of State]

Technical Cooperation, Assistance for Eritrea. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2269. Pub. 4315. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom—Signed at London June 15, 1951; entered into force June 15, 1951.

Economic Cooperation With the Federal Republic of Germany Under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, as amended. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2278. Pub. 4333. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany—Signed at Frankfurt Feb. 27, 1951, and at Bonn Mar. 28, 1951; entered into force Mar. 28, 1951.

Economic Cooperation With Portugal Under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, as amended. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2279. Pub. 4334. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Portugal—Signed at Lisbon May 17, 1951; entered into force May 17, 1951.

Technical Cooperation, Training of Venezuelan Nationals. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2280. Pub. 4336. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Venezuela—Signed at Caracas May 23 and June 7, 1951; entered into force June 7, 1951.

Violations of Peace Treaty Guaranties of Human Rights. European and British Commonwealth Series 31. Pub. 4376a. 180 pp. \$2.

Vol. I, Rumania—expression—press and publication. Supplement.

Double Taxation, Taxes on Income. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2316. Pub. 4407. 35 pp. 15¢.

Convention between the United States and Switzerland—Signed at Washington May 24, 1951; entered into force Sept. 27, 1951.

United States Educational Commission in Japan. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2335. Pub. 4438. 19 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Japan—Signed at Tokyo Aug. 28, 1951; entered into force Aug. 28, 1951.

U.S.-Italian Negotiations on Import Restrictions

[Released to the press April 16]

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

The Department yesterday delivered a reply to the Italian note of January 15 which urged this Government to revoke its restrictions on traditional Italian products, such as cheese, almonds, and hats, and to prevent any further restrictions on imports of Italian goods that would increase the dollar deficit and aggravate the economic and social difficulties of Italy. Copies of the Italian note and of our reply are available.

The Italian note raised important issues regarding recent trends in United States trade policy. United States trade policy is an important part of our over-all foreign policy which seeks to erect a firm foundation for the defense of the free world against aggression. The major problem in United States foreign trade today is the wide margin by which our exports exceed our imports, the so-called "dollar gap," which results in foreign countries not being able to pay for the American goods they need.

The dollar gap is as much our problem as that of the rest of the world. A big creditor nation that refuses to import can never expect to be paid for its exports. If we do not want to lose our export markets—and certainly no taxpayer wishes to continue to bear the burden of foreign aid indefinitely to enable other nations to buy our goods—we must import.

Furthermore, if the joint defense effort is to be strong enough to stem Soviet aggression, independent nations must act together, each utilizing its resources, plants, and manpower in the most economic manner. This will not occur by itself. It requires cooperative action and bold leadership. When inconsistencies show up in United States policy, reflecting the pressures for restrictions on trade, United States leadership is weakened. In the long run, American interests will suffer. We cannot throw up barriers here while at the same time we urge the destruction of such barriers abroad in the interests of close partnership in the free world. I am sure that the American people recognize that the United States must cooperate in

order to receive the cooperation of other nations joined with us in the defense of the free world.

U.S. MEMORANDUM OF APRIL 15

The Department of State has considered the Italian Embassy's memorandum of January 15, 1952 concerning the economic, social, and psychological repercussions on Italy of United States import restrictions. In accordance with the Embassy's request, copies of the memorandum have been furnished to the Department of Agriculture, the Tariff Commission, and other United States Government agencies most concerned with problems of this nature.

The Department wishes to assure the Italian Embassy of the continuing interest of this Government in expanding the opportunities for world trade and in permitting other countries to earn the dollars with which to pay for their essential imports, thus cutting down the need for extraordinary United States assistance. The Department believes not only that a high level of imports can be absorbed by the United States economy but that imports benefit the United States as well as the other nations joined in the defense of the free world. Existing legislation provides ample safeguards to protect domestic producers in the minority of cases where a high level of imports might cause serious injury to domestic industry. To the American consumer a high level of imports means a wide variety of goods from which to choose and generally lower prices. To many important domestic producers, imports mean an increase in the dollars available to foreign nations which makes it possible for them to buy American goods, including products from all sections of the country and from a wide range of industries. Furthermore, the threat to the security of the free world makes it even more urgent that high levels of world trade be encouraged so that the nations of the free world can cooperate in making the best possible use of their resources, their plants, and their labor force. By each contributing what it can produce most efficiently, the defense and economic stability of the democratic nations will be strengthened.

The Department would like to make the following comments on some of the specific cases which were mentioned in the memorandum and which are the subject of concern to the Italian Government. With respect to the Embassy's apprehension that restrictions on imports of olive oil may be imposed, the Department has already replied separately to the Embassy's note on this subject. No restrictions on imports of olive oil are contemplated at this time.

Section 104 of the Defense Production Act of 1951

The Administration is continuing its opposition to the extension beyond June 30, 1952 of Section 104 of the Defense Production Act of 1951. It believes that the import restrictions on cheese and other dairy products imposed

under Section 104 are inconsistent with the long-run interests of the American people including the American farmer. The Department's reasons for believing that Section 104 should not be extended are reviewed in full in the Secretary's letter of March 10, 1952 to Senator Burnet R. Maybank, a copy of which is enclosed.¹ The Senate Banking and Currency Committee recently voted to replace Section 104 with language corresponding to that of Public Law 890, legislation which existed prior to Section 104. If the Congress should finally pass legislation in this form, import restrictions on fats and oils, rice and rice products, peanuts, cheese and other dairy products would be authorized only upon the President's determination that they were essential to (a) the acquisition or distribution of products in short supply, or (b) the orderly liquidation of temporary surpluses of stocks owned or controlled by the Government. Such legislation would enable this Government to act consistently with its existing international commitments.

"Escape Clause" Actions

The Department appreciates the concern which the Italian Embassy has expressed in its memorandum regarding the so-called "escape clause" actions, that is, the modification of trade agreement concessions where serious injury is caused or threatened to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products. This Government believes that these modifications of concessions should be retained only for such time and to such extent as is necessary to prevent or remedy the injury.

Accordingly, a system providing for periodic review of "escape clause" actions is in the process of being established.² Your attention is directed to the President's letter of January 5, 1952 to the Chairman of the Tariff Commission, a copy of which was furnished the Embassy.

In this letter the President stated that he has requested the preparation of an Executive Order which would call for periodic investigation and report by the Tariff Commission on each escape clause action indicating whether or not the modified concession should be continued in its existing form. The Department believes that this procedure should help ensure that "escape clause" actions will remain in effect only so long as required to prevent serious injury to the domestic industry concerned.

Almonds

The Italian Embassy also expressed its concern over the fee on imports of shelled almonds over a certain quantity which the United States recently imposed. This restriction is applicable only to the current marketing season ending September 30, 1952, and further investigation would be required prior to any decision to extend this quota to the next season.

"Buy America" Policy

The Department appreciates the concern of the Italian Government regarding the application of the "Buy America" policy to Government procurement. It believes that permitting concerns in friendly foreign countries to compete effectively with domestic concerns in bidding for government defense contracts will result in more economical government procurement with substantial savings to the United States taxpayer. It will also give foreign countries the opportunity to raise their levels of production and earn needed foreign exchange. The Department recognizes that restrictive features of the "Buy America" policy, which was incorporated in United States statutes as early as 1933, were developed under circumstances far different from those which exist today, and warrant careful re-examination in the light of present circumstances.

¹ For text of this letter, see BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1952, p. 517.

² For text of a report on trade agreement escape clauses, transmitted by the President to the Congress on Jan. 10, see *ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1952, p. 143.

The Department once again wishes to assure the Italian Embassy of its sympathetic interest in the Embassy's concern in promoting a high level of Italian exports to the United States, thereby enhancing Italy's ability to purchase goods from the United States, strengthen its economy, and contribute to the achievement of a prosperous and peaceful world, an objective to which both our governments subscribe.

Enclosure :

Copy of letter to Senator Burnet R. Maybank

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C.

ITALIAN NOTE VERBALE OF JANUARY 15

The Italian Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to transmit the attached memorandum regarding the grave consequences for the Italian economy and Italian-American trade, of any restrictions adopted on imports of Italian goods in the United States.

The Italian Embassy will be grateful if the Department of State will call the attention of the Department of Agriculture, the Tariff Commission and the other interested United States authorities, to the serious economic, social and psychological repercussions that recent United States restrictions have had in Italy and other friendly countries of Europe, which are trying to increase their dollar earnings through exports.

For the reasons pointed out in the attached memorandum and in the previous notes submitted by this Embassy to the Department of State, the Italian Government is appealing to the Government of the United States to revoke the recent restrictions on imports of cheeses, almonds, hats, etc. and to prevent any further restrictions on imports of Italian goods that would increase the already enormous dollar deficit and aggravate the economic and social difficulties of Italy.

The Italian Embassy expresses its thanks to the Department of State for its kind attention to these problems and for the action it will deem opportune to take in response to the requests of the Embassy.

AMBASCIATORE TARCHIANI

MEMORANDUM: *Economic, Social, and Psychological Repercussions in Italy of U. S. Import Restrictions and other Protectionist Practices*

1. The question of United States trade restrictions and other measures which unfavorably affect Italian imports into this country has been the subject in recent years of frequent communication from this Embassy to the Department of State, the Treasury Department, and other appropriate United States authorities. In this connection special reference is made to a number of documents, listed under Encl. A.¹

2. The international emergency precipitated by the invasion of Korea, and the subsequent mutual defense efforts of the United States and its partners and allies, have created a new framework which is likely to continue over a number of years. It is characterized by a number of adverse features, such as shortages of essential materials and manpower, inflationary pressures, sudden shifts in the volume and terms of international trade, and so forth.

There is, however, a fair prospect that some of these difficulties can be considerably alleviated, and ultimately turned to the advantage of the cause of world-wide stability, as a result of closer economic coordination among peace-loving nations, and among NATO allies in particular.

Such coordination, as President Truman stressed on many memorable occasions, calls for a fuller utilization of the joint productive resources of the democratic nations for purposes of both defense and economic stabilization.

¹ See p. 665.

The need for coordination and utilization of the economic resources and production capacity of free nations is also receiving increasing emphasis in the quarterly report to the President from the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, which, furthermore, analyze and bring into a single focus the joint defense efforts of this country and its European partners.

3. The effects and implications of the new situation are so vast, and its ramifications so extensive, that it becomes desirable, and indeed essential, that each of the main aspects of economic relations between the nations of Western Europe and the United States be reviewed afresh, in the light of current conditions and requirements. One such aspect is foreign trade, which is of obvious and paramount significance with respect to both the major objectives of the current effort of the United States and its allies, i.e., rearmament and the maintenance of domestic and international economic stability.

4. It is hardly necessary to recall that the current mutual defense effort is based, so far as Western Europe is concerned, on the foundations built by the ECA program. In turn, the ECA programs were deeply concerned with the establishment of the freest possible flow of trade among the participating nations and throughout the free world. One of their major purposes was to make a frontal attack on the so-called "international dollar gap", or "dollar shortage" problem on the assumption that only an expanding and well-balanced pattern of foreign trade could give stability to Europe and strengthen America's first line of defense across the ocean. Consequently, it was the declared purpose of the ECA program to help reduce the unbalance in the world trade due to the "dollar shortage" stemming in turn from the chronic excess of United States exports over imports.

The ECA countries were assisted and encouraged in the organization of "dollar export drives". Steps were taken to stimulate an increasing acceptance of European imports in the United States.

The vital significance of this new policy, in the interest of the United States and its security, as well as that of world economic stabilization, was underscored in a number of important State papers such as the Gray report, the Rockefeller report, the latest reports of ECA, of the Defense Production Administrator, of the Council of Economic Advisers, of the National Association of Manufacturers, of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, and in the final declaration of the 38th National Foreign Trade Council Convention held in New York October 1951, which discussed this important and significant theme: "International Trade and Investment are essential to the Defense and Economic Advancement of the United States and the Free World".

5. All this was highly gratifying and encouraging to the Italian Government, which is extremely anxious to re-establish a situation in which Italy can earn and pay its own way through the exports of products of the skill and ingenuity of its enterprise and manpower, rather than to continue to rely on assistance. It was also realized that neither the administrative nor the legislative branch of the United States Government could be expected to disregard altogether the short-term impact of the new policy upon a number of special situations. It was felt, however, that the domestic situations requiring special safeguards could only be few and relatively limited, given the unprecedented level of prosperity reached by the United States economy in postwar years and the related situations of full employment.

It was consequently hoped that the new trend in United States foreign trade policies—already heralded prior to the Second World War by the adoption of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements policy—was here to stay, and that the anomalies and inconsistencies which still existed with respect to their practical implementation would disappear as rapidly as possible.

6. There have been, however, indications in recent months that, while the American Government continues to be fully committed to the principle of trade liberaliza-

tion, renewed recourse is being made to restrictive practices, and that the inconsistencies between principle and practice, far from disappearing, are once more increasing. Should this new trend continue unchecked, a very serious situation would result. Much of the progress made through GATT and other agreements would be undone and many of the gains of the Marshall Plan would be wasted. Such a prospect is naturally viewed by the Italian Government with considerable alarm, and is a matter of major concern, particularly under the current unsettled conditions of the international and European economy.

7. Italian exports to the United States include to a very large extent foodstuffs (such as olive oil and cheese), certain farm products (such as almonds), and a number of specialties and typical commodities. They have enjoyed in recent years a moderate expansion which, however, has hardly made a dent on the trade unbalance between Italy and the United States. In 1951 Italian imports from the United States exceeded exports to the United States by over 6 to 1, representing a total deficit of more than 350 million dollars. The hopes and prospects of further development, however, have been virtually nullified by restrictions placed by the United States Government on the import of a number of commodities which are of vital importance to Italy's economy.

Here are some examples:

a) *Cheese* imports from Italy and other foreign countries have been placed by the Department of Agriculture on a quota basis, which will cause a decrease of about 40% in one of the most important, typical items of Italian export and consequently a substantial increase in the trade unbalance against Italy. The resulting loss in dollars, probably more than 2 million, will compel Italy to reduce her purchases of wheat, cotton, and other agricultural products in the United States, whose production and export interest millions of American farmers and which constitute a burden on American taxpayers in the form of the price-support program.

The restrictions placed on Italian cheese imports seem particularly inappropriate because Italian cheeses do not compete, for the most part, with cheeses produced in the United States. Being produced from sheep's milk (pecorino and romano) or requiring many years of seasoning (parmigiano and reggiano), Italian cheeses are not competitive with their limitations which are produced in small quantity in the United States.

Imports of Italian and all other foreign cheeses in the United States as a whole still represent a negligible portion of total American consumption (less than 5% of total consumption). Therefore the benefits gained by American producers through recent restrictions of imports are limited and in any case greatly overcome by the loss of export outlets for other important American farm producers. On the other hand, these restrictions are having disastrous economic, social, and psychological effects on the Italian economy and especially on the poor regions of southern Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, where the production and export of sheep's milk cheeses to the United States constitutes the principal means of livelihood.

Moreover, the imposition of direct quantitative import restriction is in direct contradiction to the whole spirit of American foreign trade policies, and to policies which the United States has been sponsoring in Europe.

As the Italian Embassy has pointed out in recent memoranda to the Department of State, the recent restrictions on imports of Italian cheeses have voided the U.S. tariff reductions agreed upon at Torquay, reductions for which Italy granted equivalent tariff concessions in favor of the American exporters.

b) Another key item in the Italian-American trade, namely *olive oil* is threatened by similar restrictions on imports, following the demands of the California producers of olive oil to the Department of Agriculture to extend to olive oil Section 104 of the Defense Production Act, as amended, or to invoke the "escape" and "peril" clauses for an increase in tariff protection, which would curtail the imports of olive oil from abroad.

Italian olive oil, refined and packed in Italy, has earned through many years a position of well deserved prestige with the American consumers. A large market has thus been built in the United States for olive oil of high quality. Imports of Italian olive oil into this country have, therefore, in no way endangered, rather they have favored domestic production by stimulating a taste for good olive oil.

Olive oil, as cheese, constitutes one of the few Italian agricultural sources of foreign exchange earnings. Continuous export of this product is essential to Italians in order to obtain less expensive vegetable oils needed for her domestic consumption. The dollars Italy acquires from the export of olive oil are entirely spent in the purchase of soy beans, soy oil, and other oil seeds in the United States which is a traditional source used by Italy in procuring supplies of these products in the substantial quantities required.

c) Following the demands of *almond* producers, the U.S. Tariff Commission proposed and the American Government recently introduced an increase in duties on imported almonds beyond a certain quota. As a matter of fact, imported Italian almonds are not competitive but supplementary to the American production because of their particular quality and characteristics: most Italian almonds are bought by the confectionery industry, which cannot be completely supplied by the domestic production.

Measures increasing duties or otherwise restricting imports of almonds into the United States will contribute to worsen the trade deficit of a country which imports from the United States agricultural products in amounts 5-6 times surpassing the value of her exports of specialty foodstuffs to the United States.

d) The tariff duties on *women's fur felt hat bodies* have been raised, from December 1, 1950 by decision of the President following a report of the Tariff Commission suggesting the recourse to the "escape clause" mostly because of strong competition created by hats from Czechoslovakia.⁴ The effect of this action was, of course, to impose serious consequences on the Italian hat industry.

Now that the United States has withdrawn its concessions to Czechoslovakia under the GATT Convention, it should not be difficult to restore the conventional concessions to friendly countries, thereby eliminating a situation which, in addition to inflicting unnecessary damage on Italy and other democratic countries, produces very adverse psychological and political repercussions.

Such a request was made to the Department of State in the Embassy's note No. 11340 of October 23, 1951, but to date no favorable action has been taken. Meanwhile, the Italian hat industry continues to suffer serious consequences as a result of being cut off from its most important export market, the United States.

e) New threats concerning the tariff treatment of such commodities as wines, cherries, garlic, marble, motorcycles, bicycles, tobacco pipes, leather goods, etc. are looming ahead, as a result of representations of domestic manufacturers to the U.S. Tariff Commission under the "peril point" and "escape clause" of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, or to the Department of Agriculture under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.

10. The economic and other effects of this new trend are only too obvious. To quote from the *New York Times* of September 22, 1951:

It is fundamental American policy to encourage as free a flow of trade and commerce throughout the world as possible. That is one of the basic premises on which rests the Marshall Plan and in fact our whole approach to the political and economic problems of Europe, not to mention our own Reciprocal Trade Act and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to which we are party.

Inherent in this policy is the need for Europe to increase its exports to the U.S. It should be obvious

even to the most extreme protectionists that it makes more sense to help Europe earn dollars than to keep on giving dollars away while preventing Europe from earning them.

In more general terms, the effects of U.S. import restrictions can be summed up under the following heading:

(a) effects on GATT and international trade policies at large

(b) effects on the "dollar gap"

(c) effects on inflationary pressures

(d) political and psychological effects

Each of these effects will be briefly reviewed in what follows:

11. To begin with, it is clear that international trade policies are a matter not only of principle but also of practical implementation. Due tribute has been paid in previous sections of this paper to the leadership taken by the U.S. Government in bringing about a liberalization of international trade relations. The question now is that such liberalization appears to be jeopardized by recent restrictive actions, and the threats of others to come, constituting a return to harmful protectionist practices of the past.

If the United States, or for that matter any of the signatories of GATT, makes increasing recourse to "peril level" or "escape clauses" and adopts restrictive measures with respect to the very items of foreign imports which stand to benefit by conventional tariff rates and other concessions, the very heart of GATT is impaired and the whole policy of trade liberalization, while honored in principle, becomes disregarded and inoperative in practice.

The situation becomes particularly disquieting when such practices are adopted by nations having such vast power and international responsibilities as the United States:

To quote once more from the *New York Times* (November 7, 1951):

The issue is serious precisely because the U.S. and Belgium are countries heavily committed to trying to establish a system of international trade within which free enterprise can function. It is not that the U.S. and Belgium are worse than anybody else. It is not that they, of all countries, should, for reasons that from a nationalistic viewpoint are perfectly sound, risk making the whole system of international agreements a dead letter by penalizing the private enterprises in all countries that have relied on being able to do business on certain known terms and conditions.

The hat case report may well become a classic document in international trade history. It shows how conclusions about such elements as "necessity", "injury", "justifiable protective measures" differ when arrived at from the standpoint of the community of nations and when arrived at, for example, by the U.S. Tariff Commission acting in perfect good faith in accordance with the terms of agreement to which the U.S. adheres.

Nobody questioned that the U.S. had a right to consider the desire of hat manufacturers in Danbury and Norwalk, Conn. to require European hat makers to pay more than 40% to 50% duties (agreed to by the U.S. at Geneva Tariff Conference of 1947) before selling their hats in the U.S. But what sticks out a mile from this report is the chaos that faces all international trade in which private business partakes and which requires the investment of substantial capital sums if every country acts only on such considerations without submitting its actions to international review. The nationalized Czechoslovakian industries could easily juggle their prices to sell over any conceivable duty barrier. It is the private European companies that cannot.

12. As for the "dollar gap," it is apparent that, if this is to be narrowed down to limits compatible with international equilibrium, Italy and other European countries must rely chiefly on an increase in their exports of specialties and other typical goods to the United States.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1952, p. 96.

For Italy cannot be expected to compete in mass produced goods and "heavy" durables or appliances, and must concentrate on manufactured specialties requiring to a large extent the use of specialized labor and traditional skills. In all cases, these imports are but a negligible fraction of total American consumption, hence of total domestic production. And while it is the essence of competition to bring about some redistribution of resources in the interest of an efficient division of labor, the effect of these imports on American industry, including the interested segments of it, cannot be but extremely small, particularly in the context of a prospering economy of full employment.

If escape and peril clauses were invoked at will, simply to avoid the slightest injury to a marginal fringe of domestic producers, there could be no hope for Italy or other countries to develop their imports to the United States, and consequently to bring their dollar account into balance.

The situation would become particularly hopeless if the slightest indication of success in that direction in any individual line or commodity should be used as a signal for invoking escape clauses. A vicious spiral would develop and the whole process would become nugatory.

13. There can be no question but that restrictive import practices at the present time intensify inflationary pressures in this country and abroad. It is generally recognized that one of the basic means of fighting inflation, domestically and at the international level, is through production and more production, so that the gap between disposable income and consumers' goods can be narrowed and, if possible, closed. Restrictive import practices have, of course, exactly the same effect on inflation as the curtailment of production, since they affect both the supply and the price level of consumers' goods.

Even more serious is the impact of such restrictions on international inflation, since foreign countries, such as Italy, which are already suffering from adverse changes in the terms of trade of the past 18 months, are faced with additional difficulties with respect to the earning of dollars. At one and the same time, economic aid has been decreased, the Italian "dollar gap" has increased to more than 350 million dollars and Italian requirements for supplies from the dollar area have increased, both for defense production and for rebuilding after the disasters of recent floods whose damages are estimated at more than 500 million dollars.

It is unnecessary to emphasize this point, since the growing threat to the joint defense effort and to the economy of the European members of the NATO alliance has become a matter of common knowledge, and of urgent concern for the American Government.

14. Finally, there are the political and psychological effects to be considered; these can hardly be overestimated. What is at stake is the vast store of goodwill and gratitude which exists in Italy and other friendly countries as a result of the generous postwar American aid, and of Marshall Plan aid in particular. For, most segments of Italian public opinion are altogether at a loss to understand how the vast amount of help poured into Italy during the past 3 years, with the express purpose of restoring the stability of both the domestic and the international economy of the nation, can be reconciled with the recent restrictions that have hit vital sectors of the Italian economy. The very fact that these restrictions are but incidental and almost trivial within the over-all context of U.S. policies, is bound to intensify their adverse impact. This is because they appear to involve the mistaken idea that, while American policies are liberal and indeed generous at their over-all level, they acquire an altogether different connotation as soon as the protection of special interests is concerned.

This implication, no matter how unwarranted, plays directly into the hands of that vocal minority of opinion which is swayed by Communist propaganda in Europe. As it is known, the Communists noisily press their line that the Marshall Plan and other aid programs are not really

meant to bring about the economic emancipation of Western Europe but to perpetuate their dependence on American bounty, and that American aid programs are calculated to find additional outlets for domestic production, while barring the door to foreign products. The result is that a state of confusion and doubt is generated in the minds of some people—which is sedulously exploited by the Communist minority for its own ends—despite the constant emphasis of the Italian Government on the true facts.

15. The emergence of renewed symptoms of reversal to restrictive trade practices is particularly disquieting and disappointing at the present time, when the mutual defense effort of the democratic nations calls for the greatest practicable "pooling" of means and resources. In this connection it may be permissible to call attention to a situation which appears to stand out as a major inconsistency in the American policies related to the mutual defense effort, both at the domestic and at the international level. The acute shortages which have developed since June 1950 in many lines of domestic industrial production for military and other essential purposes, make it only natural that the greatest possible recourse be made to imports, particularly from friendly and allied countries.

In line with this principle, an Executive Order (no. 10210) was issued by the President of the United States in February 1951, authorizing all military and civilian procurement agencies of the U. S. Government to make defense contracts "without regard to the provisions of law" concerning the making of such contracts. The Italian Embassy understood that the Executive Order would permit the "Buy American" statute either to be waived or otherwise modified in application. Yet, certain specific instances, which have occurred recently (for instance, in connection with bids submitted to the Munitions Board on behalf of Italian manufacturers of optical and precision instruments) indicate conclusively that the Executive Order is still disregarded as concerns the statute, on the ground that the use of the authority under the Order is permissive and not mandatory. As late as September 29, 1951, the Munitions Board informed a foreign firm that "to date, this authority has not been exercised." The communication continued to the effect that, as far as the Board was concerned, the limitations of the "Buy American" Act were still being enforced, and for this reason a bid which was substantially cheaper than those submitted by American manufacturers but not to the extent of the full 25 percent prescribed in that Act, was rejected.

Recent examples of difficulties met by Italian firms because of the "Buy American" Act have been brought to the attention of the Department of State with Embassy's memorandum on the "dollar gap" problem, of September 1950, and Embassy's Note no. 13661 of December 18, 1951. Because of these difficulties Italy is losing important opportunities of work and the means of earning the much needed dollars for her purchases in the United States, and the Italian industry is prevented from helping to relieve the shortages being encountered in the defense production.

16. It is unnecessary to stress that legislation such as the "Buy American" statute, which was passed at the height of the great depression and when domestic unemployment was between 10 and 15 million persons, has become altogether obsolete and anachronistic under the conditions of full employment which have prevailed in the United States during the past 10 years. This is even more true today under the present emergency, and is recognized implicitly in the President's Executive Order which permits suspending the operation of the Act. The Order was widely publicized in Italy as evidence of the firm determination of the United States to make the joint defense effort mutual in fact as well as in name, and as a timely and welcome step toward trade liberalization in general. The fact that the Order has apparently had no influence on the administration of the statute and that the Italian industries are practically excluded from bids

that would assure substantial economy for the U. S. Government and reduce unemployment in Italy, is also a source of considerable embarrassment for the Italian Government, in the face of the many inquiries and representations which are being received by Italian firms desirous of participating in these bids.

17. In conclusion, it is certainly not the desire of the Italian Government to overrate the significance of the problems outlined in this memorandum, within the general context of the close economic and political relations between the two countries. There is no doubt, however, that their significance should not be overlooked with respect to both the present emergency and ultimate trends.

The Italian Government is confident that the Government of the United States will do everything in its power to eliminate obstacles and procedures that are proving so distressing for Italian exports to the United States, bearing in mind the necessity for Italy to reduce unemployment and increase her dollar earnings.

[Enclosure A]

PREVIOUS ITALIAN MEMORANDA ON U. S. TRADE BARRIERS AND IMPORT RESTRICTIONS

1) *Memorandum on situation and outlook of Italian exports to the United States (August 1949).*

This memorandum gave a general outline of the trade situation between Italy and the United States, illustrating the need for reduction of trade restrictions and for the increase of exports of Italian goods to the United States market.

Particular mention was made of the drastic increase in American import duties on all typical and traditional Italian exports from 1913 to 1930, and especially of the high protective barriers, customs procedures, and regulations.

The memorandum also underlined the importance for Italy of resuming her exports to the United States in order to maintain and increase her purchases of American products.

2) *Memorandum [of September 1949] on the necessity of increasing Italian exports to the United States.*

This memorandum called the attention of the United States authorities to the unnecessary hardships caused by a policy which intended to restrict imports of certain goods, but which at the same time did not succeed in promoting to any worthwhile extent the demand for similar or related domestic items. The examples given illustrated that the duty on such items during the last 25 years meant many millions of dollars in taxes paid by American consumers in the form of duties and higher domestic prices, without developing domestic production. This was especially true for items such as olive oil, anchovies, vermouth, pignolia nuts, musical instruments, etc.—some of these are absolutely non-competitive, some have characteristics which are beyond any possibility of imitation, while others, even if sold at much higher prices than the corresponding domestic articles in consequence of heavy customs duties, still appeal to certain categories of American consumers because of their traditional customs or habits (food habits, for example, of Americans of Italian extractions).

3) *Memorandum on import obstacles encountered by Italian exporters in the United States market (December 1949).*

This memorandum illustrating the facts contained in the preceding memorandum, listed a series of specific cases of the discouraging experiences of Italian exporters and the handicaps encountered by them in the introduction of new articles.

The memorandum also offered suggestions for overcoming the difficulties and the obstacles created by the highly complicated and strict regulations of the Customs, Patent, Food and Drug Administration authorities and laws such as the "Buy American" Act, Tariff Act of 1930, etc.

4) *Memorandum on the need of reducing trade unbalance between Italy and the United States through further lowering of U. S. tariff duties on typical and non-competitive Italian exports products (June 1950).*

This memorandum analyzed briefly the critical situation of the Italian export trade based on figures for the year 1949. Italy imported from the United States in 1949 6½ times (in total value) as many goods as she was able to export to the United States, (\$458.1 million versus 71.2 million). *Her annual trade deficit with the United States, which before the war (1935-38 average) was \$21.5 million, in 1949 became 18 times larger.*

A list was attached to the Memorandum showing some typical Italian export items (mostly non-competitive with American production subject to U.S. protective duties of 50 percent, 60 percent, 90 percent ad valorem).

5) *Memorandum on the "dollar gap" problem (September 1950).*

This memorandum suggested that, in order to reach a better equilibrium of trade between Italy and the United States and to lessen the Italian "dollar gap," more liberal views were needed in solving import problems, some of which were directly aggravated by the too strict application of laws or regulations such as:

1. Custom Bills and Procedures (now being revised);
2. Food and Drug Act;
3. Tariff negotiations;
4. "Buy American" Act, etc.

The memorandum pointed out that the continued existence of trade barriers raised long ago, under domestic and international economic conditions which no longer exist, was an anachronism in contradiction with the general policy followed by the United States Government and with the program of a closer international economic cooperation.

6) *Note Verbale on the subject of import quotas on cheeses, adopted by the United States on August 9, 1951.*

The note pointed out that none of the circumstances mentioned in the amended provisions of the Defense Production Act (Andresen Amendment) really existed as to require an import control of Italian cheeses, *most of which were, because of their characteristics (especially in the case of sheep's milk cheese) non-competitive with domestic production.* It was also mentioned that the restrictions on imports of Italian cheese would amount to a violation of the provision of Article II of the GATT and *would void the U.S. tariff reductions agreed upon at Torquay for which Italy had granted similar tariff reductions in favor of American producers.*

The most striking result of these restrictive measures was an increase of the Italian trade deficit and a reduction of her dollar earnings from exports to the United States, which have been used for the procurement of essential foodstuffs and raw material in this country.

7) *Memorandum on the importance for the Italian economy of exporting almonds to the United States and on the necessity of avoiding any restrictive measures in this connection (September 1951).*

This memorandum was inspired by the pressure exercised by the California Almond Growers Exchange on the U.S. Tariff Commission *which resulted in an increase on the duties of almonds imported from Italy and the adoption of other restrictive measures and controls applied to this Italian export.* The memorandum pointed out that there was no real necessity for the application of such measures because imports of Italian almonds were not in competition with local production. In fact, their particular characteristics and quality destined them to special uses, for instance in the confectionery industry, which could not be completely supplied out of domestic production.

Again, principal result of these measures was a further injury to the Italian economy and the aggravation of the trade deficit of a country that imported from the

United States agricultural products in amounts surpassing 5 to 6 times the value of her exports to the United States of typical Italian foodstuffs like cheese, olive oil, wines, etc.

- 8) *Comments on recent requests by American manufacturers for tariff increase on leather goods* (April 1951).

These were comments on some press reports which described the alarm created among United States leather manufacturers by the competition of foreign exporting firms. In order to avoid the danger of "bankruptcy" for the whole U.S. leather industry, industry spokesmen advocated an increase in tariff protection.

- 9) *Note Verbale of October 1951 on the increase of protective tariffs on fur felt hats, by the application of the "escape clause."*

The Note called the attention of the United States authorities to the fact that the new customs duties of December 1950 applied to hats and hat bodies imported from Czechoslovakia, Italy, and other countries. However, since the adoption of other restrictive measures against Czechoslovakia, the trade with that country has ceased. In consequence the above said measures might be reconsidered with advantage to both our countries.

- 10) *Memorandum of November 1951 to the ECA, aimed at having Italy included as an authorized source of supply among the countries bidding on commercial and government procurement authorization lists, at least for the products and services which Italy is in a position to offer and export.*

- 11) *Note Verbale of November 24, 1951 on the threatened adoption of quantity restrictions or increase of duties on imports of olive oil.*

The Note related that the California olive oil producers intended to invoke the adoption of quantity restrictions on imports of olive oil, under the provisions of Section 104 of the Defense Production Act, as amended, or to invoke the "escape" and "peril" clauses for an increase of the tariff protection, which would curtail the imports of olive oil from abroad.

The Note called the attention of the State Department to the fact that olive oil is one of the most important Italian exports to the United States and its sale in American markets enables Italy to buy in the United States large quantities of other foodstuffs and raw materials necessary to her economy, including the soy beans, soy oil, and other oil seeds used in Italian domestic consumption.

The Note observed also, as in the case of restrictions on cheeses, that from a practical point of view none of the conditions contemplated in Section 104 of the Defense Production Act really subsisted and that none of the circumstances under which Art. XIX of GATT admits the application of the "escape clause" were present; therefore any increase of duty or any quantity restrictions on imports of olive oil will be considered a violation of the multilateral trade agreements signed at Geneva, Annecy, and Torquay, and an unnecessary blow to a traditional current of exports which enables Italy to buy heavy quantities of agricultural products in the United States.

- 12) *Note Verbale [of December 16, 1951] complaining of the new system of subsidies adopted by the Department of Agriculture in favor of American lemon and orange exports, competing with Italian products in foreign markets.*

The *Note Verbale* points out that the adoption of these provisions by the Department of Agriculture does not appear consistent with the U.S. tariff laws, which contemplate drastic countervailing duties against foreign products benefiting of subsidies and that such regulations failed to comply with the provisions contained in Article 16 of the General Agreement on Tariff and Commerce as well as with the obligation to notify the other Contracting Parties of the intention to adopt export subsidies, indicating its importance, nature, and effects.

The Italian Government is seriously concerned regarding the effects such measures will have on the Italian economy since the citrus production and exports represent one of the few economic resources for the poor regions of southern Italy and assures work to large masses of the population. Exports of lemons, oranges, and their sub-products represent, moreover, an important source of supply of foreign currency needed for Italy's purchases of raw materials and foodstuffs abroad.

This system of subsidies, which affects important Italian trade currents, and the recent quantity restrictions on imports of products of particular interest for the Italian economy, as *cheeses, almonds, etc.*, besides seriously impairing the Italian economy tends to destroy the advantages gained through the Annecy and Torquay regulations for which Italy granted the United States adequate tariff concessions.

- 13) *Note Verbale of the Italian Embassy regarding the "Buy American" Act* (December 18, 1951).

The Note called the attention of the Department of State to the damaging effects of continued application of the "Buy American" Act in the present emergency situation requiring a closer economic cooperation between the United States and Western European countries.

The "Buy American" Act represented the natural expression of a situation of economic depression which, happily, no longer exists. Now its protective, drastic measures prevent foreign countries from participating in bids connected with economic mobilization and defense production, place obstacles in the way of relieving shortages in the United States (as machine tools, optical instruments, etc.) and simultaneously providing democratic countries with the means of reducing unemployment and earning dollars needed for their economic recovery.

Recent Soviet Maneuvers

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press April 16]

In answer to questions on whether the U.S. policy of negotiating from strength had changed in any way, in view of the current Soviet "peace offensive," Secretary Acheson at his news conference on April 16 made the following extemporaneous statement:

I think that we have always taken the view that one who is in a stronger position is much more able to negotiate than a person who is in a weak position. We never changed our view on that. We always have negotiated—we have been negotiating for years with the Soviet Union.

We have never stopped negotiating. The question is not whether you are willing to negotiate, but what you can negotiate about, and whether there is any real desire to negotiate.

I shouldn't say, in the first place, there was a stepping up of the peace offensive. If you take the whole of the Soviet propaganda together, one of the items which has taken an extraordinarily large part of the attention of all the media of Soviet propaganda has been this biological warfare matter, in which they have made the most false, continuous charges against the United States, although it is directed also against the U.N. Command in Korea. There, over and over

again, proposals have been made by us to have this investigated by the International Red Cross and to have the World Health Organization come into it.¹ But all suggestions looking toward the ascertaining of the facts are brushed over by the Soviet Union without so much as a comment. But the campaign goes on and has taken a vast amount of space in all media—radio, press, and otherwise.

Now, that, I should not call a "peace offensive." The things which you possibly have in mind are the exchange of notes in regard to Germany,² the economic conference,³ and that sort of thing.

With respect to the Moscow Economic Conference, I spoke on that subject before, and I think that everything that has happened has tended to bear out what I said at that time.

I think it is very interesting to note, if you will read my comments on March 14, that what has happened is that while the Soviet spokesmen in Moscow have been indicating a willingness to buy quantities of luxury and other goods of that sort, this is all wrapped up with and tied to the procurement of strategic materials, which are important from the Soviet point of view in building up their military strength.

The whole thing seems directed toward raising doubts as to whether the defense of the West is an urgent matter, and should be carried forward with the zeal that we all believe is necessary. I don't think that maneuver has succeeded in any way.

Founding of OAS Celebrated

*Remarks by the President*⁴

[Released to the press by the White House April 14]

It is a pleasure for me to meet with you and to extend to each one of you a personal greeting on this Pan American Day. We are celebrating the founding of the Organization of American States [OAS], which was established 62 years ago. This organization symbolizes the good-neighborly relations and the peaceful cooperation that we have developed in our inter-American system.

Last year, on December 13, the new charter of the Organization came into effect. This was a forward step in the long history of this Organiza-

tion. From now on, by virtue of its new charter, the Organization will have an even better opportunity to continue its important work of furthering the cooperation of our respective countries.

That cooperation was high-lighted about a year ago when this Government had the honor to act as host to the fourth meeting of Foreign Ministers. At that time, the Foreign Ministers gave careful consideration to the common problems facing our hemisphere by reason of the aggressive policy of international communism. Acting in accordance with the finest inter-American traditions, they worked out a common set of policies regarding our regional action in regard to that danger.

Our governments emphasized at that time our determination to uphold our common objective of achieving a peaceful and cooperative world order. We expressed our firm resolve to strengthen our defenses only in order that our countries might continue to live in peace and devote themselves to promoting the cultural and economic welfare of their peoples. Our policy continues to be guided by that purpose today.

The Organization of American States is tangible evidence of our belief that cooperative effort among nations is essential to prevent aggression, to eliminate want, and to increase human liberty and happiness. In the achievement of these aims, the principles of mutual respect, of solidarity, and of belief in the dignity of man, upon which our inter-American system rests, are of profound importance. They express the essence of our common faith and form the basis of our common purpose.

This anniversary should be a day of rededication to the great spiritual values of our common heritage.

In that spirit, I extend my best wishes to each of you and through you to the Organization of American States and to the peoples which it serves.

Fellowships Available for Study In Latin America

[Released to the press April 17]

A few fellowships for study in Latin America are still available under the U.S. Government's educational exchange program for the current year, the Department of State announced on April 17. Offered under terms of the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, which provides for an annual exchange of students between the United States and each of the signatory republics, the fellowships are tenable in Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 427, and Mar. 24, 1952, p. 452.

² *Ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1952, p. 531.

³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1952, p. 447.

⁴ Made at Washington, on the occasion of receiving members of the Council of the OAS on Pan American Day (Apr. 14), 62d anniversary of the founding of the Pan American Union, keystone of the OAS.

Completed application forms must be returned to the International Educational Programs Branch, U.S. Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, Washington, before May 20. The Advisory Committee on Exchange of Students will nominate a panel of five candidates to be submitted to each of the four countries concerned. Final selection of two persons to study in each country will be made by the government of the respective country. Application forms and further information regarding these fellowships may be obtained from the Office of Education.

Under this program the U.S. Government provides transportation to and from the receiving country, and the host country pays tuition, a monthly maintenance allowance, and in some cases a small allowance for books and incidental expenses. It will probably be necessary for the stu-

dent to supplement his maintenance allowance from other sources to meet cost-of-living expenses.

Applicants should have the following general qualifications: U.S. citizenship; a bachelor's degree or its equivalent at the time of acceptance of the grant; sufficient knowledge of Spanish to carry on the proposed study; and a good academic or professional record. Since appropriate university study facilities are not available in all the countries, candidates must be capable of carrying on independent research. They are therefore required to present a suitable plan of study or a research topic approved by their adviser or supervising professor, if enrolled in an educational institution, or by the Office of Education, if not so enrolled. All other considerations being equal, persons under 35 years of age and veterans are given preference.

Mutual Security Requires Mutual Understanding

by Wilson Compton

*Administrator, International Information Administration*¹

The U. S. International Information Administration is important. Its commission comes from Congress. Its operating tools include press and publications services, radio—that is the Voice of America—motion pictures, overseas information centers, and the interchange of persons.

The International Information Administration deals with ideas. It does not deal with bullets, though there is a very specific relationship between ideas and bullets. It is my belief—and history supports me in this—that ideas can be more powerful than guns. It is my belief that the successful operation of the International Information Program can mean the difference between global peace and global war. It is my belief that our security rests in large part upon our ability to promote an honest understanding of America and America's aims as well as to counter the lies and the half-truths which the Communists are telling about us.

Today's world is a dangerous world. The freedoms which we cherish can no longer be taken for granted. The menace of aggressive international communism confronts many free nations

to whose security our own is very directly related; and it confronts us. We are concerned for our national security today, and we are doing something about it. We are concerned also about our security tomorrow and we should be doing something about that, too.

That, my friends, is why I want to talk to you about America's foreign policy and about the role of the International Information and Exchange of Persons Program in helping to make that policy effective.

Our Foreign Policy Defined

What is America's foreign policy? When I came to the Department of State some weeks ago I asked the same question. I was given a pamphlet of about 75 pages entitled "Our Foreign Policy."² That pamphlet made interesting reading. And it is available to anyone who wants it.

I was told also that if I wanted a more extensive definition I could get it in about an 8-foot shelf of documents; or if I wanted it in complete historical perspective from the beginning of the Republic, I could find it on a whole wall of the library.

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the Southern Pine Association at New Orleans, La., on Apr. 7 and released to the press on the same date.

² For excerpts from this pamphlet (Department of State publication 4466), see BULLETIN of Mar. 24, 1952, p. 478.

Since then I have seen our foreign policy stated in 10 short paragraphs on a single typewritten page. But I like an even shorter—if unofficial—definition:

"Our foreign policy is the average reaction to international affairs of the ordinary decent American citizen, conscious and reasonably well informed of our relations with other nations, who wants first, to have his own chance in life; second, to assure at least as good a chance in life for his children; third, to wear his own collar; fourth, to live in peace; fifth, to be a good neighbor."

Now, this statement of foreign policy has little to do either with an 8-foot shelf of documents or with official "gobbledegook." And to the extent that it implies that the U.S. Government stands around waiting for something to happen on the international scene before taking concrete action, it is certainly not realistic.

But it does give us an excellent point of departure. By and large, it is consistent with the basic objective of a sound democratic foreign policy as the Department of State sees it. That objective is to preserve the security of the Nation while helping to create a decent world environment.

Simple? Perhaps. But sometimes—and much to our regret—the seemingly simple things prove to be the most difficult. But the difficulty is not so much in determining the policy itself as in choosing or deciding the specific means of carrying it out. That is where we often get into controversy. In foreign affairs as in domestic affairs, every American has his own opinion. As I have said, "He wants to wear his own collar."

Basic Premises

Now, I do not want to assail you with a long dissertation on foreign policy. I do want to spend some time talking about the U.S. International Information Administration. But I do think that we ought to examine some of the basic premises upon which America's foreign policy rests.

One major premise is that our freedom and our security are directly linked to the freedom and security of the entire free world. The Mutual Security Program, under which we are cooperating with our friends in building the defensive strength necessary to deter aggression, is based on this assumption.

The truth is that America cannot go it alone in this kind of world. I am equally certain that we do not want to. I hope that we shall not be penny-wise and pound-foolish. If we are, we will pay the consequences or, if we do not, our children will.

A second premise of America's foreign policy is that it seeks a just peace. Let me repeat that phrase: "a just peace."

It is certain that we cannot have security for ourselves if we do not have a just and stable peace.

It is equally certain that we cannot have security with a synthetic peace manufactured in and dictated from the Kremlin. Peace without justice is not peace.

The President made that point in a recent statement from which I quote:

... we must build peace in the world: not peace at any price, but a peace in which the peoples of all countries—big and little alike—can live free from the fear of aggression.¹

A third premise of our foreign policy is that America's security is directly affected by the social and economic condition of the other free peoples. I am thinking here of the living standards of the hundreds of millions of people living in the underdeveloped areas.

America will not have genuine security without a stable peace. We will not have a stable peace so long as hunger, illiteracy, and disease are rampant among millions of people who know that there is a better way to live and are determined to seek it.

Communism feeds on economic discontent and social upheaval. Communism holds out the hope—false though it be—of a better world. And though the Communists' promises are one thing and their actions quite another, we dare not assume that they are not getting results. For the hungry, the sick, and the unlettered, the picture the Communists paint is much like the straw for which the drowning man grasps.

If we Americans wish to preserve and strengthen our own freedom, we must encourage and help the rest of the free world to do likewise. It is a tragic fact—but a fact, nevertheless—that hungry people are as much concerned with bread as they are with freedom. And communism pretends to offer bread.

This is where our Point Four Program of technical cooperation with the people of underdeveloped areas comes in. Point Four marks America's awareness of how our own security is related to the standard of living of other peoples.

It is designed to help the peoples of underdeveloped areas to help themselves. It is designed to raise their standards of living by helping them to develop a technological understanding of their own. Point Four symbolizes the helping hand of Christian doctrine even as it is a positive force against the inroads of communism. It is one of our greatest investments in peace, and one of the least expensive.

A fourth premise of American foreign policy, the last I am going to discuss, is that we must take *positive action* to promote both economic stability and military strength among our free neighbors. The North Atlantic Pact, the job which General Eisenhower is doing to build an effective European defense force, the Marshall Plan, the economic and military provisions of the Mutual Security Program—all of these things

¹ See *ibid.*

have been and are a part of the building of a free-world bastion strong enough to deter aggression or, if necessary, to defeat it.

America cannot go it alone in today's world. We are big, but we are not that big. We are a wealthy Nation, but not that wealthy. We need friends. But we need solvent friends; and we need to stay solvent ourselves.

The aid we are giving Europe is not charity. It is an investment in free-world stability and in our own security. We are not committed to support foreign economies indefinitely and we should not be. We are committed to helping these economies to become self-supporting.

But we should not make the mistake of thinking of economic and military aid as distinct and separate. They are anything but that. A nation's military potential is—and always has been—directly related to its economic potential. We should not shut our eyes to this fact.

An Instrument of Foreign Policy

Now let me talk about the International Information Administration as an instrument of American foreign policy.

Recently, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, made a significant statement about the International Information Program in his testimony before Congress. The general, like most top military men, is concerned primarily with our military defenses.

This is what the general said about the relationship between American security and our overseas information program:

We must go all out in the battle of ideas. Only thus can we hope to convince potential aggressors that another war cannot pay.

I am convinced that failure to carry on a vigorous offensive in the field of ideas would be to invite calamity. Let us make no mistake—we are not going to get into a propaganda war. We are already in it and we had better stay in it, if we want what we need, namely, allies who understand us, respect us and have faith in us.

But there is a vast distinction between what we are seeking to do in the international information field and what the Soviets are doing. The Iron Curtain countries have geared their propaganda to the "Big Lie," an inhuman mixture of deceptions, half-truths and no truths at all. The present Soviet charge that we have been using bacteriological warfare in Korea is typical. It is a complete fabrication from start to finish.

Now, it takes a lot of money to sustain a worldwide "Big Lie" campaign. The Soviet Union and its satellites are now spending more than 1 billion, 400 million dollars.

We have geared our program to the "Big Truth." That costs much less than the "Big Lie." During the current fiscal year, we have for the

"Big Truth" campaign overseas an appropriation of 85 million dollars. For the next fiscal year, the President has asked 133 million dollars for these purposes. Last week, the House Appropriations Committee recommended 111 million dollars to the House as a whole for conducting the information and educational exchange program.

Whatever Congress' final decision, we will get along. I am more interested in our doing a good job with whatever funds Congress decides to make available than in complaining because it did not appropriate more.

Our Campaign of Truth is the road to victory in the battle of ideas. This is not only a moral evaluation, important as that may be. It is a conclusion based upon hard facts.

Consider, if you will, what we are doing with the written word. We are reaching a large foreign reading audience.

Our press materials, for example, daily go to an estimated 10,000 foreign newspapers with a readership of more than 100 million. For the most part, these materials are distributed through our information centers overseas to the newspapers and other publications in their areas.

As for magazines, pamphlets, and other publications, plans call for production of more than 91 million copies during the current fiscal year. Inasmuch as an average of five or more people read a single copy, these publications have a minimum audience of nearly one-half billion people.

And that is quite an audience.

I might say, also, that these publications are printed in about 60 different languages. One publication, for example, has been reproduced in 26 languages.

You will be interested to hear that the paper which goes into our press releases and publications is purchased almost exclusively in this country. During the current fiscal year, we will be buying some 7,000 tons of newsprint and more than 2,000 tons of book and other paper stocks.

Motion pictures, which we are producing in 40 different languages, have proved particularly effective in telling America's story abroad. Last year, our films told that story to more than 500 million people in 86 countries. This year, the number who will view the films is expected to be even greater.

Another vitally important phase of America's Campaign of Truth is the exchange of persons program. In the past year, nearly 8,000 students, teachers, professors, and leaders came to this country from abroad or went overseas on U.S. Government-sponsored grants. But many more thousands traveled the two-way street of understanding as the guests of private individuals and agencies. Right now, for example, there are more than 30,000 foreign students studying on about 1,400 American campuses. Less than 10 percent of these students are supported by U.S. Government funds.

At present, we are putting strong emphasis on the exchange of leaders—journalists, labor leaders, government officials—people who are opinion-moulders and can exert influence in their home countries. These are people who have learned the truth about America first-hand and can spread the truth among their own peoples when they return.

In addition to publications, motion pictures, and the exchange-of-persons program, we are operating a vast chain of overseas information centers which greatly assist the other programs I have just described. At the present time we have 165 overseas information centers located in 59 countries and 34 binational centers in 22 countries. These centers provide not only a place for distributing materials, but provide local citizens with a variety of services. They contain well-stocked libraries and are the meeting place for lectures, discussions, concerts, and motion-picture showings.

Communist Reaction to VOA

Perhaps the best evidence of the effectiveness of these programs is the reaction of the Communists themselves to what we are doing.

Take radio—the Voice of America.

We know that the Soviet Union *alone* is spending over a billion dollars a year on its propaganda activities. Much of that is being spent to keep our information materials and the Voice of America from penetrating the Iron Curtain.

The Soviets are spending almost as much on jamming our radio broadcasts to Russia as we are spending on our entire world-wide radio program—a program in which we are now broadcasting in 46 languages. The total Soviet expenditure on propaganda activities is more than 10 times as great as the amount we are spending on our international information activities. These are not merely educated guesses. These are estimates taken from the Soviet Union's own published reports.

The psychotic Communist fear of the facts and of America's Campaign of Truth is also evidenced by the methods the Communist governments use to keep their people from listening to our broadcasts and from reading our information materials.

Severe penalties are imposed on people in the Soviet Union and in the satellite areas who are caught repeating what they have heard over the Voice of America. In many areas, owners of radio sets are under surveillance. Electric current has been turned off in rural areas during peak Voice of America broadcast hours.

The Communist press maintains a constant barrage of criticism of our information program. It constantly seeks to discredit our reliability.

Communist government leaders, such as Premier Gottwald of Czechoslovakia, have publicly

stated that our information campaign is hitting them where it hurts. They have warned fellow Communists that everything possible must be done to "stamp out" listening to the "criminal" Voice of America. The Soviet Union has nearly 1,000 radio stations doing almost nothing else but trying to jam our broadcasts. The Communists have gone to great lengths to keep the Voice of America from penetrating the Iron Curtain. But they will not succeed.

We are getting through the Iron Curtain. In some of the satellite areas our listening audience is as much as 80 percent of those who have radio receivers. In some areas in the Soviet Union, 75 percent of our broadcasts get through the jamming screen. In Moscow and Leningrad—where the jamming is particularly intense—our penetration average is about 25 percent.

We are now broadcasting around the clock to the Iron Curtain countries in their own languages. If we don't get through one time, we do another.

Recently, as you may know, we commissioned a novel floating radio transmitter. It is mounted on a ship and is operated for us by the Coast Guard. It carries powerful short-wave transmitters and one 150,000-watt medium-wave transmitter which is three times as powerful as the most powerful transmitter in operation in the United States today. We are also building seven broadcasting stations with many new electronic features. Each of these seven stations will have a signal power of a million watts—20 times as great as that of the most powerful commercial stations known to be operating anywhere in the world today. Two of these transmitters will be operated in the United States, one in North Carolina, and one in the State of Washington. The other five are at strategic points overseas.

We have asked Congress for authority to construct additional installations of the same power. We have also asked for two more floating transmitters, each with a power of 500,000 watts or 10 times that of our most powerful domestic stations. The House Appropriations Committee has recommended a substantial amount for these purposes. What Congress will do, of course, remains to be seen.

I mention these facts to show the extent to which the Voice of America is now penetrating the Iron Curtain, the provisions under way and in prospect for increasing that penetration and overcoming Communist jamming techniques. If within a few years we are able to complete these powerful radio broadcasting and relay installations, we will be able to reach over 98 percent of the world's population with the Voice of America. Meantime, we hope to keep on improving the message of hope, friendship, and helpfulness with which we shall continue to seek the understanding, respect, and confidence of all peoples.

U.S. Security Intertwined With Free World

America's security is intertwined with the security of the whole free world. We need our friends even as they need us. The free peoples can effectively deter or defeat aggression only if we maintain our strength, our stability, and our unity of purpose.

America has been generous with her assistance to other peoples. We are generally respected among the other free nations, even admired, and considerably envied. But we are by no means universally trusted. Many people—even among the nations which are our staunch allies—are inclined to question our motives. Too many people have a distorted picture of our American democracy—an impression which is being energetically promoted by Moscow. This is one of the most formidable aspects of the so-called Cold War in which we are now engaged.

It is important that we do not shut our eyes to this fact. Russia is not winning the Cold War. But Russia could win it if we fail to meet our responsibilities in the informational arena.

We have made and are continuing to make positive gains. We can make even greater gains with your help—with the help of the American people. I have said that the business which has brought me here is your business just as much as it is my business. It is the business of every American.

We are taxing ourselves and spending huge amounts now for a very simple purpose: We do not want a third world war. A third world war is not necessary. It is not inevitable. It is less likely to happen if we are strong.

But we can never win a peace with armaments alone. Ideas and attitudes are equally important. The battle for men's minds cannot be neglected. In the long run, success in this battle may well prevent one of bullets and bombs on the global scale.

And that brings me to the question of America's long-run economic stability.

When I was a young fellow I studied economics. I have never ceased to study it, and I marvel at some of the odd economic adventures which we undertake. But it does not take a great economist to know that what we borrow we pay for; that what someone borrows, someone else lends, that there is no mysterious way in which liabilities become assets. The economics which I learned says that this applies to governments too.

We are today investing heavily in the means of war because we must. We are investing at the

same time in the means of peace. That is the kind of investment for which I speak to you today. An investment in the minds of men everywhere—an investment that will build understanding, respect and trust for America. If we do not learn to make an investment in ideas, no amount invested in guns and tanks and bombs will bring peace to us or to our grandchildren.

The kind of peace we seek must—first and foremost—be based upon the unity of all the free peoples. That unity cannot be preserved by wishful thinking or by shirking, avoiding, or ignoring the issues which constantly arise. We Americans must learn to understand and respect other peoples. We must help them to understand us. We must learn to see and respect the values in their customs and cultures as well as our own; and we must see that they have an understanding of our American way of life.

The free world's moral strength lies in mutual understanding; and if the free world does not have moral strength it is not strong, however large its armies and however vast its armaments. Let us make no mistake about that. We cannot have mutual security without mutual understanding; and we cannot have mutual understanding if we do not work at it.

We are working at it through the U.S. International Information Program for which I speak. That is the reason I say that this program may in the long run play a key role in determining whether we are to have peace or war.

As a patriotic organization representing an important group of American taxpayers, the Southern Pine Association is, of course, interested in keeping governmental expenditures to a minimum level consistent with national security.

To the extent that our efforts in the "war of ideas" strengthen the free world and weaken the threat of Communist aggression, to that extent will American taxpayers benefit. To the extent that we can add to the solidarity and the mutual confidence of the free peoples, to that extent will we Americans have greater security.

This is not far-fetched. It is simple arithmetic. Nearly three-fourths of our governmental expenditures today is related to national defense and national security.

To skimp on the provisions necessary for our national security while the present dangerous situation exists, would be foolhardy. But to look ahead to a time when such great expenditures for these purposes may not be necessary is good economics and plain common sense.

Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly

SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACTION: PART II

by Paul B. Taylor

Economic Questions

A large share of the work of the Second and Third Committees, dealing with economic, social, and humanitarian questions, consists in the consideration of the relevant sections of the report of the Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc); they do, however, handle some matters directly without prior Council consideration. Most of the problems are subjects of continuing study from year to year, in the developing work of the United Nations in this field.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The Second (Economic) Committee considered the general problem of economic development which has attracted growing attention in United Nations economic discussions in recent years. The key problem was that of financing economic development. As at the preceding session, many underdeveloped countries urged that additional facilities for international financing of economic development be created and that an international fund be established by the United Nations to give grants in aid for non-self-liquidating projects. A resolution proposed by Chile, Cuba, Burma, Egypt, and Yugoslavia was adopted by the General Assembly on January 12 by 30 votes to 16 with 11 abstentions. The resolution requested Ecosoc to submit to the next Assembly session detailed plans for establishing a special fund for grants and long-term low-interest loans to underdeveloped countries. The United States opposed

this resolution, mainly on the ground that no developed country is in a position now to contribute to a fund of this nature and that the adoption of a resolution calling for a fund, or for studies leading to the creation of such a fund, would give rise to expectations which could not be fulfilled. On the subject of economic development the Assembly also adopted a resolution asking Ecosoc, in continuing its studies, to pay particular attention to the financing of non-self-liquidating projects through existing institutions.

LAND REFORM

The problem of land reform, which Secretary Acheson raised in a speech before the fifth session of the General Assembly and on which the Assembly, Ecosoc, Fao, and other specialized agencies had worked during the past year, came up for discussion. The Assembly adopted a resolution sponsored by the United States and representative countries from all the other regions of the world, that approved the comprehensive resolution on this subject adopted by Ecosoc at its thirteenth session¹⁵ and made additional recommendations to governments.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

On the subject of technical assistance, the main resolution,¹⁶ introduced by the United States, approved the work which Ecosoc had done in this field, provided for the pledging of contributions

EDITOR'S NOTE: Part I of this article appeared in the BULLETIN of April 21, 1952, page 632.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1951, p. 473.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Dec. 17, 1951, p. 995.

for 1952, called for cooperation by private and nonprofit organizations, and recommended the strengthening of internal machinery within the governments of underdeveloped countries for planning programs.

A resolution relating to emergency international action in the event of famine was introduced by the United States. It requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate specialized agencies, to recommend procedures for effective concerted action in the event of famine caused by national disasters. It also gave the Secretary-General the authority to draw upon the resources not only of governments but also of private, voluntary organizations.

Social and Humanitarian Questions

REFUGEE PROBLEM

At the sixth session, the Assembly further considered the international refugee problem. It adopted resolutions that asked the governments to cooperate with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, authorized the High Commissioner to issue an appeal for funds for emergency aid to the most needy group of refugees within his mandate, and recommended continuing efforts by all states and agencies concerned to give special attention to the refugee problem in connection with programs of economic reconstruction and development and with migration projects.

CHILDREN'S FUND

The Assembly continued its support for the U.N. International Children's Emergency Fund. It appealed to governments and private persons to continue to contribute to the fund during 1952. The United States has always been by far the largest contributor to the refugee and the UNICEF programs. However, the U.S. delegation abstained from voting on the resolutions relating to contributions to these two programs on the ground that it was not in a position to give assurance that the United States would make an additional governmental contribution to these programs.

HUMAN RIGHTS

The major part of the discussions in the Social and Humanitarian Committee related to the drafting of covenants on human rights. Consideration of the difficult problems involved in the preparation of such instruments has taken place in previous sessions of the Assembly, in the Commission on Human Rights, and in Ecosoc in past years. In the recent session of the Assembly, as in previous discussions, the United States made clear its readiness to participate in the effort to draft acceptable covenants on this problem for later consideration and possible ratification by member states. The Assembly discussions related

to a number of general directives which member states wished the Assembly to lay down for the guidance of the Human Rights Commission in its further efforts to draft the necessary legal instrument. One important resolution provided that separate covenants should be drawn up at the same time, one to contain civil and political rights, and the other to contain economic, social, and cultural rights. The United States supported this action on the grounds that problems of drawing up and applying treaty provisions in these two fields are quite distinct and that to treat them together would make the entire process more complex and difficult.¹⁷

Ten resolutions provided directives to the Human Rights Commission in the further elaboration of this subject. The Social and Humanitarian Committee as well as other committees discussed the principle of self-determination. A number of delegations strongly advocated that provisions on this subject be included in the human rights covenants. The U.S. delegation supported the inclusion of appropriate provisions on this subject in the covenants. The resolution as drafted, however, was unsatisfactory to the United States, mainly because it dictated to the Human Rights Commission the precise language which was to be included. The U.S. delegation accordingly opposed the resolution which was adopted on this subject.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

In the field of freedom of information, the Assembly postponed action on the two conventions proposed in this field, as well as on the other aspects of the subject. A significant debate took place on the violations of freedom of information committed by Czechoslovakia in the trial and imprisonment of William Oatis. Channing H. Tobias of the American delegation, as well as a number of other delegates, delivered powerful indictments of the unjustified actions of the Czechoslovak Government in this case.

Problems of Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories

The work of the Trusteeship Council in relation to the trusteeship system takes place under the authority of the General Assembly, and a large share of the work of the Assembly's Trusteeship Committee consists of the detailed consideration of the Council's annual report. In addition, by the provisions of chapter XI of the Charter, those states administering non-self-governing territories not under international trusteeship submit information on economic, social, and educational conditions in these territories to the Secretary-General. In a sense, therefore, a large share of the work of

¹⁷ For a statement by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt on this subject, see *ibid.*, Dec. 31, 1951, p. 1059.

the Trusteeship Committee consists of a careful review of the information submitted to it concerning the operation of the trusteeship system and the pertinent developments in non-self-governing territories reported to it by the responsible powers.

Of the 60 members of the Committee, 8 are states which administer non-self-governing territories; the remaining 52 have no such responsibilities. Since the inception of the Committee, certain members of the administering group have tended increasingly to differ with certain nonadministering members in their approach to questions considered by the Committee. These differences became somewhat more pronounced at the sixth session of the General Assembly. The United States at this session continued to pursue moderate policies and to attempt to obtain the largest possible measure of agreement with respect to such policies.

Most of the resolutions adopted by the Assembly on the basis of reports from the Trusteeship Committee related to the working of the trusteeship system and the treatment of information furnished on non-self-governing territories under article 73 (e) of the Charter. Among the more controversial proposals adopted by the Assembly were resolutions providing for the participation of indigenous inhabitants of trust territories in the work of the Trusteeship Council; inviting administering authorities to specify a period of time in which it is expected that trust territories shall be given self-government or independence; setting up a special committee to consider administrative unions affecting trust territories; and providing for participation in the Special Committee on Information from non-self-governing territories. With a few exceptions, the United States voted for all of the resolutions approved by the Assembly in this field.

The efforts of the United Nations to find a solution to the perplexing problem of South-West Africa, formerly a mandate under League of Nations supervision, continued to be a controversial issue. When the Trusteeship Committee decided to grant a hearing to certain South-West African chiefs or their spokesmen, the South African delegation withdrew from the Committee, contending that its action was illegal. The Assembly adopted two additional resolutions on the substance of the problem. The most important of these urged the Union of South Africa to resume negotiations with the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South-West Africa for the purpose of concluding an agreement providing for the full implementation of the 1950 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which had held that the Union of South Africa continued to have the international obligations stated in article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the mandate for South-West Africa. The resolution also authorized the *Ad Hoc* Committee to examine reports on the administration of the territory of South-West Africa

as well as petitions relating to the territory. In a second resolution, the General Assembly reasserted the opinion that the normal way of modifying the international status of South-West Africa would be to place it under the international trusteeship system by means of a trusteeship agreement.

Budgetary and Administrative Questions

The Assembly took a number of important decisions in the administrative and budgetary field. By a vote of 47 to 5, it set the 1952 budget for the United Nations at \$48,096,780. Although the United States, in line with our objective of economical operations without curtailment of essential U.N. functions, had unsuccessfully opposed in the Administrative and Budgetary Committee certain increases, it voted in favor of the final budget. The opposing votes were cast by the Soviet-bloc states on the ground that the budget was unduly inflated, particularly since it authorized expenditure of funds to implement a number of political decisions opposed by the Soviet Union. The Assembly adopted, by 46 votes (U.S.) to none with 4 abstentions, permanent staff regulations to replace the provisional regulations drawn up in 1946. These regulations set forth the policies governing the relationship between the Secretary-General and his staff. The Assembly also established a Negotiating Committee to solicit funds from U.N. members and nonmember governments to finance certain operational programs of the United Nations which are not provided for in the regular budget. These programs include the technical-assistance program, the Korean Relief and Reconstruction Agency, and the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

One of the most important financial problems, from the point of view of the United States, was the question of the establishment of the scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations among member governments. The United States has maintained since the First General Assembly that no one member state should contribute more than one-third of the ordinary U.N. expenses for any one year. In 1948 the Assembly endorsed this principle, and the U.S. contribution, originally set in 1946 at 39.89 percent, has gradually been reduced. The Committee on Contributions recommended to the sixth session that the U.S. contribution for 1952 be set at 36.90 percent, a reduction of 2.02 percent from the 1951 assessment. This recommendation was based on the fact that, in considering the rate of progress which should be followed in achieving the ultimate objective of eliminating maladjustments, the Committee agreed that for 1952 the scale should reduce existing maladjustments by one-third.

The U.S. delegation vigorously maintained that

the United States contribution should immediately be reduced to 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent, in accordance with the principle established by the Assembly in 1948. Since the acceptance of the United States position would have meant fairly substantial increases in the contributions of other states this year, a majority of delegations, although recognizing the long-term merits of the United States claim, were firmly opposed to the United States position. The majority considered that the policy adopted by the Contributions Committee would lead to a reduction of the United States contribution to one-third over a 3-year period, and this was the maximum concession they could make. Only two states voted in favor of the United States position, 29 voted against, and 20 abstained. The United States then abstained in the vote on the resolution finally adopted by the Assembly which set the United States contribution to 36.90 percent. Under section 602 of Public Law 188 (82d Congress, 2d session), the United States was prohibited from making a commitment requiring an appropriation of funds for a contribution by the United States in excess of 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent without prior consultation with the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives.

Legal Questions

The Sixth (Legal) Committee considered, among other subjects, the procedure to be followed by the United Nations concerning the making of reservations to multilateral conventions, the improvement of the Assembly's methods and procedures for dealing with legal and drafting questions, and the definition of aggression. The International Law Commission had considered the definition of aggression, but was unable to agree on specific recommendations. The United States strongly maintained that it was impossible to draw up a complete list of acts of aggression which would include all conceivable situations, that omissions in the definition would encourage an aggressor, and that the organs of the United Nations should pass on the aggressive nature of each case submitted to them. The General Assembly adopted a procedural resolution simply providing for inclusion of the question of the definition of aggression in the agenda of its next session. The United States voted against this resolution because of two paragraphs that somewhat prejudiced the question of whether aggression should be defined.

Conclusions

In attempting to appraise any single session of the General Assembly, one should remember that the functions of the General Assembly are not those of an *ad hoc* conference called at a chosen time to deal with a particular matter. They are,

rather, functions which need to be performed regularly each year: political action on matters placed on the agenda, reviewing the United Nations work as a whole, keeping the machinery in motion by making necessary financial appropriations and holding necessary elections, and providing a forum in which any state may say whatever it wishes about international affairs in general. The Charter provided for this procedure on the theory that the annual review of the work of the United Nations and of international events generally is in itself useful to the international community. Beyond that, the significance of the acts or debates of any session will obviously depend upon the circumstances existing in international affairs at the time and, in addition, on the effectiveness of the between-session work of the councils and other bodies which come up for a final stamp of approval by the General Assembly. Moreover, many of the most important projects of the General Assembly are cumulative in nature, extending over several years. Thus, the final emergence of a united and independent Libya, which received the blessing of the Assembly at this session, is in large part the result of actions taken by the Assembly as far back as 1949.

In our view, the essential political task of the General Assembly at this session was the implementation and further development of the major United Nations and free-world programs, initiated in previous years, for the maintenance and strengthening of peace and security. The broad question which was constantly before the Assembly in many forms was whether nations would move forward in realizing this program or would be induced by the U.S.S.R. to slacken their efforts and accept Soviet substitutes for the program. The Assembly decisively rejected as substitutes for security the Soviet proposals for paper "disarmament," a Five Power pact, condemnation of U.S. military assistance to other countries, and condemnation of NATO. Had a Korean armistice been achieved, the Korean problem would have been one of the outstanding items of the session. However, since the negotiations at Panmunjom continued throughout the entire session, the Assembly steadily refused to embark on any discussions of the problem in order not to jeopardize these negotiations in any way; naturally, too, it refused to accept the proffered Soviet substitutes for the U.N. program in Korea.

In the notable disarmament resolution, the Assembly advanced the over-all U.N. program one important step. The votes on these major East-West issues were large; usually only the Soviet bloc voted in the negative. However, the interplay of other issues, notably those affecting the Near and Middle Eastern countries, led to an increased number of abstentions.

Problems of the Near and Middle East received special attention throughout the session, and the member states of those areas tended to work to-

gether, in an Arab-Asian bloc, in order to make their points of view prevail.

The Assembly did useful work in the economic, social, trusteeship, budgetary, and legal fields. In each of these fields, as well as the political field, neither the United States nor any other member always had its way.

Although the sixth session was actually slightly shorter than average sessions of the Assembly, the members generally felt that new efforts should be made to shorten future sessions substantially. A Norwegian proposal on this subject, submitted during the last few days, could not be acted upon. However, the Secretary-General will study the problem in consultation with permanent U.N. delegations and member governments.

• *Mr. Taylor, author of the above article, is officer in charge of General Assembly Affairs for the Bureau of United Nations Affairs. He served as principal executive officer of the U.S. delegation to the Sixth General Assembly.*

Collective Security To Preserve the Peace

*Statement by Harding F. Bancroft
Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations¹*

My Government believes that the task before the Committee this year is to carry forward the momentum started in the Uniting for Peace resolution;² to strengthen the United Nations in the field of collective security. As Secretary of State Acheson said in 1950 when the Uniting for Peace resolution was introduced, "The United Nations must move forward energetically to develop a more adequate system of collective security. If it does not move forward, it will move back."³ This year, as in the years to come, we should continue to move forward. The world waits to see whether we can build on the start we have made.

The report of the Collective Measures Committee last year and the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on January 12⁴ provide guideposts for our work.

First, my Government suggests that we examine the report and fill in the gaps that necessarily remain because of the short period we had at our disposal last year. The filling of these gaps in

the field of collective economic measures as well as of military measures can help to insure that United Nations collective action will be timely and effective in case of need. The Secretariat, with its usual competence, has given us a working paper⁵ which is most helpful in pointing out the topics in last year's report which require further attention. We believe that the idea of a U.N. legion in particular is a subject well worth exploration. We think that a realistic evaluation of its possibilities should be made this year by the Collective Measures Committee.

I feel sure that members of this Committee, as well as the Secretary-General, will have other ideas which can be fruitfully considered so that we can build on the foundations already laid down. It would be well to invite suggestions from other states, not represented on this Committee, on matters to which attention should be given. Such suggestions might cover either proposals for more detailed treatment of subjects touched upon in our first report or proposals for study of other subjects within the general area of our work. In addition, the Committee should continue its analysis of the U.N. action in Korea since our last report, so that the advance planning which the United Nations can do will have the full benefit of that experience.

Second, both the report and the resolution of the General Assembly stress the need for member states to take preparatory action so that they will have the capability in immediate readiness to contribute armed forces and other assistance and facilities in support of U.N. collective action. This ability and readiness the General Assembly recognized in its resolution are "essential to an effective security system." The Committee should therefore consider what it can do to promote and facilitate national action on the part of member states in the four general areas in which the General Assembly has recommended preparatory action. These are—

(1) that states take further action to maintain forces so trained, organized, and equipped that they could promptly be made available for service as U.N. units in accordance with constitutional procedures;

(2) that states prepare themselves so as to be able to provide assistance and facilities to U.N. forces engaged in collective measures;

(3) that states determine in the light of their existing legislation the appropriate steps for carrying out promptly and effectively U.N. collective measures of all sorts;

(4) that states continue the survey of their resources in order to ascertain the nature and scope of the assistance which can be rendered in support of U.N. action.

In the view of my delegation, the Collective

¹ Made in the Collective Measures Committee on Apr. 15 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

² BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1950, p. 523.

⁴ For an article by Joseph J. Sisco on the Collective Measures Committee's report, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1951, p. 771; for text of General Assembly resolution see United Nations, *Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during 6th Session*, 6 Nov. 1951–5 Feb. 1952, p. 2.

⁵ No. 2/52 dated Apr. 7, 1952.

Measures Committee can be helpful to member states in carrying out these recommendations of the General Assembly. The need for coordinated preparation has been demonstrated. Our work can show how individual states can prepare themselves most effectively to unite their strength with other members of the United Nations in the common objective of keeping the peace. Member states have already recognized the need for further preparatory steps by their support of the Uniting for Peace resolution and of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly this year. The Committee can build upon this willingness to take such action by suggesting further practical steps.

Another important question for us to consider is the nature of the machinery that the United Nations should have for the future in order to continue its progressive development as a collective-security organization. During this second year of our work we should be able to foresee with greater clarity the longer term needs of the United Nations in this field. While all of us recognize that our basic objectives cannot be accomplished in a short time, and that greatest progress may be achieved only in graduated steps, we can provide that machinery for the United Nations which will

insure that its development, though gradual, will be steady and certain.

The work of this Committee has the realistic objective of organizing our collective strength to preserve the peace and to insure that neither this strength nor the power of individual states will be used save in the common interest. Our efforts are based on the proposition that the more effectively the members of the United Nations are organized to unite their strength to maintain peace, the less likely it is that world peace will be challenged.

This work in no sense detracts from the fundamental importance of pacific settlement. A system of collective security is more than the organization of collective strength. It includes also the development of procedures for negotiation and other methods of peaceful adjustment, under principles of justice and international law. The greater progress that we can make in this Committee the greater will be the opportunity for the processes of pacific settlement to ease the political tensions in the world. It should be our resolve to make the United Nations work *in all its aspects* in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

The Tunisian Question in the Security Council

On April 2, 11 delegations to the Security Council from African and Asian states addressed similar letters to the President of the Council drawing attention to "the present grave situation in Tunisia" and requesting that the Council call a meeting for consideration of the matter. The Council held its first meeting on the Tunisian question on April 4; a second meeting was held on April 10. At the third and final meeting on April 14 on this question, the Council rejected inclusion of the item in its agenda by a vote of 5 in favor (Brazil, Chile, China, Pakistan, U.S.S.R.), 2 against (France, U.K.), and 4 abstentions (Greece, Netherlands, Turkey, U.S.).

Following are texts of statements regarding the U.S. position in the matter by Secretary Acheson and by the Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Ernest A. Gross:

PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press April 16]

I think our position was stated quite clearly by Ambassador Gross, but I would be glad to state it again. I think what we have to always have in

mind is Judge Holmes' famous statement, that general principles do not decide concrete cases.

We have a duty as a member of the Security Council to exercise our best judgment as a matter of policy, as to whether taking up a given matter in the Security Council at a particular time will or will not contribute to the solution of that problem. We cannot get into an automatic position where the fact that someone has proposed a resolution automatically requires the United States to vote that the matter should be discussed at that time, when in the judgment of the U.S. Government that will not be the best way of contributing to the solution of the problem.

The problem is the problem in Tunisia. The people in Tunisia have aspirations. The French Government has stated that it is willing to go a long way toward meeting those aspirations. It seems to us that the sound way to proceed here is to give time for the French authorities and the Tunisian authorities to discuss, negotiate, and find a solution.

Now, if they can't, another situation is created.

We can always reconsider whether the time at which a matter should be discussed in the Security Council is the appropriate time. But what we are attempting to do is to exercise our best judgment

as to how to reach a sound solution in the interests of both parties to a dispute. It seems to us that our action in saying that this is not the time when we wish to vote to have that matter before the Council was the best way to contribute to the solution of it.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GROSS¹

I express the following views of my Government on this subject.

It is only natural that the States which have proposed inclusion of this item on the agenda, drawing heavily upon their own past experience, should do everything they consider helpful in encouraging the progress of other areas towards self-government.

My Government has always considered that the United Nations organ should be available for examination of any problem which causes serious friction in international relations. For this reason we have supported inscription of charges, however groundless or malicious, when made against us. At the same time, it is clear that under the Charter, the parties to a controversy are obliged to seek a solution by negotiation. As Security Council consideration should be designed to help the parties reach agreement, each member of the Security Council, which acts on behalf of all members of the United Nations, has a responsibility to ask himself whether consideration of a problem in the Council at a given moment will really help to bring the parties closer to the desired agreement.

From the information available to my Government, it would appear that the essential facts may be summed up as follows. There is a genuine and broadly shared desire on the part of the inhabitants of Tunisia for a greater voice in the government of that area. On the other hand, French authorities have recognized the validity of Tunisian demand for internal autonomy. They have proposed a plan for the people of Tunisia to progress toward that goal and it is hoped that negotiation between the French authorities and the Tunisians will soon begin.

We do not wish to pass judgment upon the most recent developments in Tunisia. The United States, however, cannot condone the use of forceful methods by either party. Force cannot possibly be an end in itself. Force and violence only serve to embitter the atmosphere and thus impair the chances of peaceful progress toward the common objective.

It is the belief of my Government that at this moment it is more useful to concentrate on the

¹ Made before the Security Council on Apr. 10 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

problem of facilitating negotiations between the French and the Tunisians than to engage in debate at this table. The overriding objective of the Security Council must be to foster agreement through negotiation between the parties themselves. The French program of reforms, in our view, appears to constitute a basis for the resumption of negotiations looking toward the establishment of home rule in Tunisia. We fervently hope that France, faithful to its tradition, will bring about farsighted and genuine reforms in Tunisia; history has taught us that in the long run the voices of those who really represent a people will be heard and will assert themselves.

The Council will note that in stressing the desirability of negotiation, I am not dealing with the question of the Council's competence to consider this matter. If this item is not included on our agenda at this time, the Council will, nevertheless, remain open to any member of the United Nations to bring the question to the Council's attention again. My Government would naturally reassess the situation if that is done.

For these reasons, Mr. President, I have been instructed to abstain on the question of including this item on our agenda at this time.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Apr. 14-19, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

No.	Date	Subject
261	4/5	Compton: Information program
263	4/7	Iran: Student assistance
*276	4/14	Acheson: Greetings to Cambodia
*277	4/14	Point 4 course completed
*278	4/14	IRAA and Point 4 exhibit
279	4/14	Human Rights Commission
†280	4/15	Cowen: Mutual Security Program
281	4/15	Japanese treaty ratified
282	4/15	Iran: Point 4 agreements
*283	4/16	Sargeant: Together we are strong
†284	4/16	Acheson: \$10 million aid for Korea
285	4/16	Acheson: Trade policy note to Italy
286	4/16	Exchange of notes with Italy
*287	4/16	Murphy: Ambassador to Japan
*288	4/16	Sebald: Ambassador to Burma
289	4/16	Allison: Our Far Eastern policy
290	4/16	Acheson: U.N. vote on Tunisia
291	4/16	Acheson: U.S.S.R. "Peace Offensive"
*292	4/16	Acheson: Greetings to Laos
293	4/17	Latin American fellowships
294	4/17	Ilo regional conference
295	4/17	Inter-Wheat Council
†296	4/17	Colombia: Military assistance
†297	4/18	Sorenson: Point 4 director
†298	4/18	Paso: Executive meeting
299	4/19	Acheson: World security progress

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Commission on Human Rights (ECOSOC)

On April 14 the Department of State announced that Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. representative on the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, will attend the eighth session of the Commission, which will convene on that day at New York, N. Y. She will be assisted by the following advisers:

Advisers

Herzel H. E. Plaine, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, Department of Justice
James Simsarian, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
Marjorie M. Whiteman, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Ad Hoc Advisers

Harper Barnes, Assistant Solicitor, Department of Labor
Herbert W. Beaser, Office of the General Counsel, Federal Security Agency
Frieda S. Miller, Director, Women's Bureau, Department of Labor

The Commission on Human Rights, which is one of the nine permanent functional commissions of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, advises and assists the Council on all matters relating to the obligation assumed by the members of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Eighteen governments, elected by the Council, comprise the membership of the Commission. Its seventh session was held at Geneva, Switzerland, April 16-May 19, 1951.

At its eighth session the Commission will give high priority to carrying out the directives contained in resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. At its fifth regular session the General Assembly had decided that, as civic and political freedoms and economic, social, and cultural privileges were interconnected and interdependent, provisions relating to these subjects should be included in the Covenant on

Human Rights. Upon reconsidering the matter at its sixth regular session (Paris, Nov. 6, 1951-Feb. 5, 1952), the General Assembly decided that the Commission, instead of incorporating such provisions in a single instrument, should prepare two draft covenants, one relating to civil and political rights and the other relating to economic, social, and cultural rights. The Commission was directed also to incorporate in each draft covenant (1) an article concerning the right of all peoples and nations to self-determination, and (2) specific clauses relating to the admissibility and legal effect of such reservations as any country might desire to make with respect to provisions of the covenant in becoming a party thereto. In addition, the Commission was requested by the General Assembly to prepare recommendations on measures for carrying out the provisions of the two covenants after their entry into force.

Priority will also be given by the Commission to the formulation of recommendations on international respect for the self-determination of peoples, a subject which is to be considered by the General Assembly at its seventh regular session in 1952. Other items on the agenda for this session of the Commission relate to such topics as: (1) review of the work program of the Commission, and the establishment of priorities with respect to its activities; (2) definition and protection of political groups; (3) injuries suffered by groups through the total or partial destruction of their media of culture and their historical monuments; (4) development of the work of the United Nations for wider observance of, and respect for, human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world; (5) annual reports on human rights; (6) a draft declaration on the rights of the child; (7) the rights of the aged; (8) the right of asylum; (9) an international court of human rights; (10) the continuing validity of minorities treaties and declarations; and (11) the Yearbook of Human Rights.

International Wheat Council

The Department of State announced on April 17 that on that date the eighth session of the International Wheat Council would convene at London. The U.S. delegation is as follows:

Delegate

Leslie A. Wheeler, Collaborator, Office of the Secretary, Department of Agriculture

Alternate Delegate

Elmer F. Kruse, Assistant Administrator for Commodity Operations, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture

Congressional Adviser

Walt Horan, House of Representatives

Members

Maurice M. Benidt, Chief, International Wheat Agreement Staff, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture

Albert J. Borton, Chief, Commodity Program Division, Grain Branch, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture

Anthony R. DeFelice, Attorney, Office of the Solicitor, Department of Agriculture

Eric Englund, Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, London

Robert L. Gastineau, Head, Grain Division, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

L. Ingemann Highby, Chief, Food Branch, Agricultural Products Staff, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State

Earl O. Pollock, Assistant Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, London

Roger Stewart, Chief, Grain Branch, Food and Agriculture Division, Mutual Security Agency

The International Wheat Council was established in 1949 pursuant to the terms of the International Wheat Agreement of March 23, 1949, an instrument designed to assure supplies of wheat to importing countries and markets for wheat to exporting countries at equitable and stable prices. Administration of the agreement is the primary function of the Council, which is composed of the representatives of 46 exporting and importing countries parties to the agreement. Each member country may be represented at Council sessions by a delegate, an alternate delegate, and such technical advisers as are necessary.

Article 22 of the agreement provides that "The Council shall, not later than July 31, 1952, communicate to the exporting and importing countries its recommendations regarding the renewal of this Agreement." It is expected that the Council at its forthcoming session, will approach the matter through giving detailed consideration to the amendments required to make renewal of the agreement generally acceptable to all the member countries.

The last (seventh) session of the International Wheat Council was held at Lisbon, October 30–November 2, 1951.

American States Members of ILO

On April 17 the Department of State announced that on that date the fifth Regional Conference of American States Members of the International Labor Organization (ILO) would convene at Rio de Janeiro. The tripartite U. S. delegation to the Conference is as follows:

REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegates

Philip M. Kaiser, Assistant Secretary of Labor

H. M. Dooty, Chief, Division of Wages and Industrial Relations, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor

Advisers

Wilbur J. Cohan, Technical Adviser to the Commissioner for Social Security, Federal Security Agency

John T. Fishburn, Labor Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegate

Charles E. Shaw, Director, Employee Relations Overseas, Standard Oil Company (N. J.), New York, N. Y.

Advisers

Ward H. Donahoe, Insurance and Social Security Division, Department of Standard Oil (N. J.), New York, N. Y.

L. Roy Hawes, Past Master, Mass. State Grange, North Sudbury, Mass.

REPRESENTING THE WORKERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegate

Serafino Romauldi, Latin American Representative of the American Federation of Labor, A. F. of L. Building, Washington

Adviser

Michael Ross, Director, Department of International Affairs, Congress of Industrial Organizations, Washington

The forthcoming Conference is one of a series of meetings initiated by the Governing Body of the International Labor Office in 1936 for the discussion of those subjects relating to the work of the Organization which are of particular interest to the countries of the American continent. The last (fourth) Regional Conference of American States Members of the ILO was held at Montevideo, April 25–May 7, 1949. The 19 American States which are members of the ILO have been invited to participate in the forthcoming Conference.

Among the items on the provisional agenda of the Conference are the report of the Director General, application and supervision of labor legislation in agriculture, achievements and future policy in social security, and methods of remuneration of salaried employees.

The United States in the United Nations

April 11–April 24, 1952

General Assembly

The Collective Measures Committee—Continuing its second year of studying the ways and means of strengthening international peace and security in accordance with the Uniting for Peace resolution and the General Assembly's resolution of January 12, 1952, the Collective Measures Committee (Cmc) held its opening meeting on April 15, at which it approved a list of twenty nominees to the panel of military experts and began general debate on its program of work.

Harding Bancroft, the U.S. deputy representative on the Cmc, opened the general debate by stressing that the committee should carry forward this year the momentum of the Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950, to strengthen the U.N. in the field of collective security. "This year, as in years to come," added Mr. Bancroft, "we should continue to move forward. The world waits to see whether we can build on the start we have made."

Mr. Bancroft laid particular emphasis on the need for member states to take additional preparatory action to place themselves in a position of readiness to make maximum contribution to the U.N. collective-security system. Mr. Bancroft said that

both the report and the resolution of the General Assembly stressed the need for member states to take preparatory action so that they will have the capability in immediate readiness to contribute armed forces and other assistance and facilities in support of U.N. collective action. This ability and readiness the General Assembly recognized in its resolution are "essential to an effective security system." The committee should, therefore, consider what it can do to promote and facilitate national action on the part of member states in four general areas in which the General Assembly has recommended preparatory action. These are:

One, that states take further action to maintain forces so trained, organized, and equipped that they could promptly be made available for service as U.N. units in accordance with constitutional procedures.

Two, that states prepare themselves so as to be able to provide assistance and facilities to U.N. forces engaged in collective measures.

Three, that states determine in the light of their existing legislation, the appropriate steps for carrying out promptly and effectively, U.N. collective measures of all sorts.

Four, that states continue the survey of their resources in order to ascertain the nature and scope of the assistance which can be rendered in support of U.N. action.

In addition, Mr. Bancroft indicated other lines along which the committee might proceed during the next several months. He suggested that the Cmc examine its first report with a view to filling

in the remaining gaps. In this connection, Mr. Bancroft added:

We believe that the idea of a U.N. legion in particular is a subject well worth exploration. We think that a realistic evaluation of its possibilities should be made this year by the Collective Measures Committee.

Mr. Bancroft said also that another important question to consider is the nature of the machinery that the United Nations should have for the future in order to continue its progressive development as a collective-security organization. Concluding, Mr. Bancroft stated:

The work of this committee has the realistic objective of organizing our collective strength to preserve the peace and to ensure that neither this strength nor the power of individual states will be used save in the common interest. Our efforts are based on the proposition that the more effectively the members of the United Nations are organized to unite their strength to maintain peace, the less likely it is that world peace will be challenged. . . . This work in no sense detracts from the fundamental importance of pacific settlement.

In addition to holding general debate, the committee approved the list of 20 nominees to the Panel of Military Experts submitted by the Secretary-General. Now that Cmc has approved the list, the 20 high-ranking officers are available on request to states wishing to obtain technical advice regarding the training, organization, and equipment of elements of national armed forces for prompt service as U.N. units. Of the 20 officers, 8 belong to the Army, 6 are Navy officers, and 6 represent the Air Force. The U.S. officers are Lt. Gen. W. D. Crittenberger, U.S. Army, Vice-Admiral Oscar C. Badger, U.S.N., and Lt. Gen. H. R. Harmon, U.S.A.F.

Korean Relief

Cash and commodity contributions totaling \$448,587,702 have been pledged or contributed for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea, according to the report submitted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Economic and Social Council.

\$243,940,531 of this total has been contributed to the emergency program which has been carried on by the Unified Command since the outbreak of hostilities. The contributions have come from 38 states, 5 U.N. agencies, and over 20 nongovernmental organizations. The U.S. Government's contribution amounted, through March 3, 1952, the reporting date of the Secretary-General's report, to slightly over \$215,000,000.

\$205,000,000 has been contributed to the U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency, which was established by the United Nations to undertake the post-war relief and rehabilitation program. Twenty-seven states have made pledges to this agency. At present, pending the cessation of hostilities, UNKRA is cooperating closely with the Unified Command in the emergency relief program by providing personnel and supplies. In conjunction with the Unified Command, it is making plans for the post hostilities and is gradually assuming a larger role in the present program so that it may assume full responsibility by the target date of 180 days after the cessation of hostilities.

Economic and Social Council

Commission on Human Rights—On April 14 the Commission on Human Rights reconvened at the U.N. headquarters for its 8th session. It proceeded first to reelect the officers who had served at the 7th session:

Dr. Charles Malik (Lebanon), Chairman;
René Cassin (France), First Vice-Chairman;
Mrs. Hensa Mehta (India), Second Vice-Chairman
H. F. E. Whitlam (Australia), *Rapporteur*.

By the end of the first week, the Commission had adopted a self-determination article for inclusion in both the covenants which it is expected to draft: one on civil and political rights and one on economic, social, and political rights. The article reads:

All peoples and all nations shall have the right of self-determination, namely the right freely to determine their political, economic, social and cultural status.

All states, including those having responsibility for the administration of non-self-governing and trust territories and those controlling in whatsoever manner the exercise of that right by another people, shall promote the realization of that right in all their territories, and shall respect the maintenance of that right in other states, in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

The right of the peoples to self-determination shall also include permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence on the grounds of any rights that may be claimed by other states.

The United States voted in favor of the first two paragraphs and opposed the third. An article on this subject is being included upon the express directions of the General Assembly.

The Commission is currently debating a resolution on the subject of self-determination which will go forward to the Assembly and will supplement the article in question.

The Commission has not yet determined how or in what order it will approach the two covenants whose completion is its main task for this session.

Commission on Narcotic Drugs—Discussion of the proposed single convention on narcotic drugs to replace the 1912 convention and 7 other agreements and protocols is the major item on the 14-point agenda of the 7th session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which convened on April

16 at U.N. Headquarters. The Commission will also study coca leaf addiction in South America and control of new synthetic narcotics.

Last year the Commission undertook a preliminary study of a draft convention prepared by the Secretariat but postponed full discussion because few governments had had an opportunity to prepare comments. The U.N. Secretariat draft proposes to replace the existing Commission on Narcotic Drugs with an international drug commission which, though subject to the general authority of the United Nations, would be a relatively autonomous body. The proposed commission would establish policy to be implemented by an international drug board, which would replace the present Permanent Central Opium Board and Supervisory Body. The control of synthetic narcotic drugs is being considered on the suggestion of the French Government. Although control for certain synthetics has been established, variations in formula make it possible to create new and uncontrolled drugs. The commission will consider whether international measures should be taken to meet this problem.

Security Council

Tunisia—The Council held three meetings, April 4, 10, and 14 to discuss inclusion of the Tunisian Question on its agenda as requested by 11 member states: Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. The proposal was rejected, April 14, by a vote of 5 (Brazil, Chile, China, Pakistan, U.S.S.R.)-2 (France, United Kingdom)-4 (Greece, Netherlands, Turkey, United States). The Council also rejected by the same vote: (1) a Chilean draft resolution to include in the Security Council agenda consideration of the 11 communications with regard to the situation in Tunisia, but to postpone consideration "for the time being"; and (2) Pakistani draft resolution which called for an invitation to be extended to the above-sponsoring delegations (with the exception of Pakistan) to reply to remarks made by the French representative at the Council meeting on April 4.

Ambassador Ernest A. Gross (U.S.), in explaining the abstention of the U.S. Government, stated:

It is the belief of my government that at this moment it is more useful to concentrate on the problem of facilitating negotiations between the French and the Tunisians than to engage in debate at this table. The overriding objective of the Security Council must be to foster agreement through negotiation between the parties themselves. The French program of reforms, in our view, appears to constitute a basis for the resumption of negotiations looking toward the establishment of home rule in Tunisia. . . . The Council will note that in stressing the desirability of negotiation, I am not dealing with the question of the Council's competence to consider this matter. If this item is not included on our agenda at this time, the Council will, nevertheless, remain open to any member of the United Nations to bring the question to the Council's attention again. My government would naturally reassess the situation if that is done.

April 28, 1952

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